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SUMMARY
Cloud computing and big data technology continue to revolutionize how computing
and data analysis are delivered today and in the future. To store and process the fast-
changing big data, various scalable systems (e.g. key-value stores and MapReduce) have
recently emerged in industry. However, there is a huge gap between what these open-
source software systems can offer and what the real-world applications demand. First,
scalable key-value stores are designed for simple data access methods, which limit their
use in advanced database applications. Second, existing systems in the cloud need auto-
matic performance optimization for better resource management with minimized opera-
tional overhead. Third, the demand continues to grow for privacy-preserving search and
information sharing between autonomous data providers, as exemplified by the Healthcare
information networks.
My Ph.D. research aims at bridging these gaps.
First, I proposed HINDEX, for secondary index support on top of write-optimized key-
value stores (e.g. HBase [14] and Cassandra [9]). To update the index structure efficiently
in the face of an intensive write stream, HINDEX synchronously executes append-only
operations and defers the so-called index-repair operations which are expensive. The core
contribution of HINDEX is a scheduling framework for deferred and lightweight execution
of index repairs. HINDEX has been implemented and is currently being transferred to an
IBM big data product.
Second, I proposed Auto-pipelining for automatic performance optimization of stream-
ing applications on multi-core machines. The goal is to prevent the bottleneck scenario in
which the streaming system is blocked by a single core while all other cores are idling,
which wastes resources. To partition the streaming workload evenly to all the cores and
xiii
to search for the best partitioning among many possibilities, I proposed a heuristic based
search strategy that achieves locally optimal partitioning with lightweight search overhead.
The key idea is to use a white-box approach to search for the theoretically best partitioning
and then use a black-box approach to verify the effectiveness of such partitioning. The
proposed technique, called Auto-pipelining, is implemented on IBM Stream S.
Third, I proposed ǫ-PPI, a suite of privacy preserving index algorithms that allow data
sharing among unknown parties and yet maintaining a desired level of data privacy. To
differentiate privacy concerns of different persons, I proposed a personalized privacy def-
inition and substantiated this new privacy requirement by the injection of false positives
in the published ǫ-PPI data. To construct the ǫ-PPI securely and efficiently, I proposed to
optimize the performance of multi-party computations which are otherwise expensive; the
key idea is to use addition-homomorphic secret sharing mechanism which is inexpensive





In the last decade, we witnessed the advent and rise of the era of cloud computing and big
data. Cloud computing has dramatically changed the way we live our lives. Many human
activities are nowadays supported online and in the cloud, ranging from social networking,
shopping, Healthcare, and even political campaigns. The new needs for big-data computa-
tion in the cloud has given rise to a new market for cloud services: On the front end, many
web companies emerge to support domain-specific human activities, such as Foursquare for
social networking, Amazon.com for shopping and so on; On the back end, various generic
cloud service providers come into being to serve the cloud workload for the front-end com-
panies in a cost-effective way. The most famous cloud service providers include Amazon
AWS, Microsoft Azure, and IBM SmartCloud.
A typical cloud system, illustrated in Figure 1, interacts with three external parties: a
cloud service provider for provisioning the computing resources on which the cloud sys-
tem is up and running, a small front-end web company that administrates and manages the
cloud system, and a large number of end users who use the end service provided by the
cloud system and delegate their personal data to the cloud. A real-world example follow-
ing this new computing paradigm is the Foursquare case, in which the front-end webpage
(i.e. Foursquare.com) serves mobile social users using the cloud resources provisioned by
Amazon AWS.
A cloud cluster usually spans across multiple domains. For example, in Amazon AWS,
there are multiple administrative domains, called availability zones, each dedicated for













Figure 1: A typical system in a cloud
availability zone, there are multiple data centers geo-distributed at different locations. A
domain can also be a service provider itself. While a small company may delegate its
own data to one or more cloud services, cloud services are under different and separate
administrative domains which present security challenge for data sharing between domains.
A cloud system internally consists of a large computer cluster which is organized into
multiple tiers, typically, with a web tier, an application tier, and a storage tier. To support
functionality at different tiers, various scalable software systems emerge in the age of cloud
computing. Most of them fall under two categories: 1) big data processing systems such as
MapReduce [61]/ Hadoop, Dryad [81] and Hive [8, 124], and 2) big data storage systems,
such as the increasingly popular NoSQL stores (also called key-value stores [53, 14, 9]) and
NewSQL systems [57, 43]. My thesis research primarily focuses on the big data storage
systems.
Many key-value stores deal with write-intensive data. In many modern cloud applica-
tions, data is innately write-intensive. In the Web 2.0, for example, average users not only
2
read the news, but also contribute their own ideas and write news by themselves in the form
of social status, blogs, etc. Write-intensive data is also widely observed in the application
areas of financial trading, online gaming and etc. Therefore, it is desirable to optimize
the write performance for cloud software systems, particularly in the case of key-value
stores. Many key-value stores (including BigTable [53], HBase [14], Cassandra [9], Lev-
elDB [10], etc) adopt a log-structured merge tree or LSM [99] for optimized random-write
performance. By the design principle, LSM is a system that makes a trade-off between
purely log-structured systems (e.g. LFS [105]) and update-in-place database systems (e.g.
MySQL).
Under this perspective for cloud computing, I address many new challenges for de-
signing secure and high-performance cloud systems, and propose several new technical
solutions.
1.2 Challenges
1.2.1 Trust and Security
The cloud computing essentially requires the full user trust and this raises controversies.
On the one hand, the cloud service providers always claim themselves being trustworthy;
“Do not be evil” is a common slogan used by Google and many other cloud providers.
On the other hand, a large number of data-loss incidents happen every day in the cloud;
for instance, user payment information in the Target store was massively disclosed in Dec.
2013 [11]. A cloud service provider may find it difficult to maintain trustworthiness due to
multiple factors: 1) Under the pressure of U.S. government, a cloud service provider may
have to turn in the personal user information for national security purposes at the expense
of user privacy. Consider the recent PRISM scandal where NSA (i.e. National Security
Administration) collects personal information through various channels of networks and
big-data companies without notifying the data owners. 2) The systems and networks in the
cloud are error prone; what is particularly common in large-scaled data centers is system
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failure, power outage and etc. To stay trustworthy, the cloud service providers need to
be fault tolerant, which is challenging: In the real life, cloud users may experience the
constant unavailability of their data in the cloud. Recently in Jan. 2014, GMail has been
down more than one hour during which period of time GMail users in the global can not
access their personal email online. 3) Cloud service providers are driven by profit and have
the incentive to be “evil”. For example, Facebook has once changed its term of services,
trying to own the copyright of its users’ social presence data (e.g. status updates and blogs).
In that case, the cloud users’ data do not belong to the users any more. 4) Given a large
number of hackers on the Internet, the design of cloud systems has to be secure and resilient
to various attacks, which by itself presents a huge challenge.
While we have seen that it is unlikely, if not total impossible, to assume a trustworthy
cloud, there is a new research area based on the untrusted cloud. It considers that an aver-
age cloud user should submit his/her data to the cloud with data fully encrypted. To enable
the regular query processing in the cloud, the emerging research focuses on the technique
for “querying encrypted data”. Representative work includes CryptDB [102] from the sys-
tem community and FHE [72] from the cryptography community; in particular, FHE (fully
homomorphic encryption) is a recent theory breakthrough which enables generic compu-
tations over encrypted data. However, along this line of research, a big problem is the
performance overhead. The computation cost of current FHE techniques is so high that
they prohibit practical use.
Given the drawbacks of assuming a cloud is either entirely trustworthy or entirely not, a
more practical model for the cloud system is a hybrid trust model. Given multiple domains
in the cloud, some service providers or domains are trusted while others are not trusted.
A cloud user has the freedom to choose which service providers to trust. A representative
system under this trust model is the information networks. In an information network, a
cloud user can choose to trust a service provider and store his/her personal data there. The
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providers have the responsibility to protect user privacy as regulated by various domain-
specific laws (e.g. HiPAA [7] for protecting Healthcare data privacy). A real-world exam-
ple of information networks is the emerging Health Information Exchange systems (e.g.
NHIN [24], GaHIN [6] and CommonWell [3]), in which each hospital is considered as a
service provider which stores patients’ medical records on their behalf. From an application
point of view, information exchanges between different autonomous providers are critical.
For example, without information exchange, a doctor may not be able to quickly find the
patient’s history of hospital visits for immediate and accurate medical diagnosis and treat-
ment. For another example, a research facility may want to learn the pattern of disease
outbreak which involves aggregating patient information across multiple hospitals. How-
ever, privacy issues are raised when information is exchanged across autonomous domains,
which may disclose private information to unintended hospitals. It is therefore desirable to
preserve user privacy and information confidentiality during the information exchanges.
1.2.2 Performance
In the age of cloud computing, scalable software systems run data-intensive workloads on
a large number of commodity machines. The design of these systems achieves scalability
at the expenses of simplified functionality. For example, existing key-value stores support
only Put/Get alike API, and considers a simple key-value data model. While this suffices
to support the basic web applications, it may fall short when the applications become com-
plicated, such as database applications which require complex SQL support. It thus calls
for scalable SQL support in the cloud.
Today’s cloud workload is typically data intensive and dominated by data writes mostly.
To be able to persist the intensive data writes efficiently, append-only design is commonly
applied in the cloud system, which aims at transferring random disk accesses to sequential
ones in order to save disk seeks. However, the append-only design usually sorts data based
on arrival time and thus destroys the data locality; data versions of the same key are spread
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across multiple places on disk, which in turn slows down the data-read performance. This
is especially the case for supporting SQL queries that involve various data access methods.
Therefore, it presents a challenge to optimize the query performance in terms of both reads
and writes in the data-intensive applications.
In a cloud system of massive number of machines, operational cost could be pro-
hibitively high due to the constant system failure and software misconfiguration which
require human involvement. To improve the operational efficiency, automation is crucial.
In particular, automatic performance optimization is a challenging task. On the one hand,
there are so many possibilities in configuring the distributed large software in the cloud.
To search for the best configuration for a particular workload, it entails iterating through
all possibilities which can be a heavy and daunting task. On the other hand, workloads in
a cloud are dynamic and changing in nature, which requires the performance optimization
component to quickly find the best configuration and to catch up with the workload changes
in real time. In other words, the performance optimization should be lightweight and re-
sponsive. Therefore, it presents a challenge to design a lightweight online optimization
scheme for large-scale cloud systems supporting dynamic workloads.
1.3 Thesis Statement
Motivated by the importance and challenges of secure and high-performance big-data ser-
vices in the cloud, the goal of this dissertation is to demonstrate the following thesis state-
ment:
The big-data storage and serving in the cloud can be made secure and high-performance
in the presence of multi-domain cloud infrastructure, write-intensive database workloads
and large scale distributed systems.
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1.4 Technical Contributions
1.4.1 Extending Key-Value Stores with Efficient Secondary-Index Support
I proposed HINDEX to extend the key-value stores’ API to support value-based data access.
Specifically, the Put/Get API exposed by existing key-value stores allows only key-based
data access in the sense that data key k is a required parameter as in the API calls, Put(k, v)
and Get(k)→ v. Given that many database and web applications require value-based access
(e.g. in an SQL query, an attribute value can be used in the WHERE clause), HINDEX aims
at adding value-based access methods to the existing key-value stores with a proposed new
API: ReadValue(v)→ {k}. Given that data in key-value stores is of multiple overwriting
versions [62], ReadValue is designed to return the latest and freshest version in real time.
In the system design of HINDEX, the challenges come from the performance aspect. In
order to guarantee that ReadValue returns the latest version and the index structure is al-
ways fresh, it is necessary to read and delete the old data versions upon a data update. Given
the log-structured design of key-value stores, the performance of a write (or a Put) is opti-
mized at the expenses of the read (or Get) performance. Therefore the conventional way to
update index structure which requires reads would greatly slow down the data ingest rate.
The technical contribution of HINDEX is a scheduling framework that executes the expen-
sive read-and-delete operations in a lightweight fashion. I proposed an offline scheduling
strategy which co-schedules the read-and-delete operations with a compaction, which is a
native offline process in many key-value stores that reorganizes the on-disk data layout and
cleans up data garbage. Based on this new scheduling strategy, the write performance of
indexed system is significantly improved, as verified by our real-world experiment evalua-
tion.
HINDEX has been implemented on HBase. Based on collaborative work with an IBM
colleague, part of the HINDEX technique is currently being transferred [113] to an IBM
big-data product, BigInsights [1].
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1.4.2 Searching Information Networks with Personalized Privacy Preservation
In information networks, data sharing is established by first searching for a provider of
interest. Such search may disclose private information, since the search result contains the
sensitive linkage information regarding which provider a person has delegated his/her data
to. In the health domain, for example, such information discloses a patient’s history of
hospital visits which is deemed sensitive and private. While existing search facilities in
the market, most notably record locator service [25, 4], do not address privacy concerns,
I proposed a privacy-preserving index, called ǫ-PPI [116], for privacy-aware search in the
information networks. In particular, ǫ-PPI personalizes privacy preservation to address the
different privacy concerns regarding different data owners (e.g. patients). Towards this
goal, I proposed a noise-based technique to control the confidence that an attacker can have
when attacking based on the ǫ-PPI search result.
Under this framework, I discovered a generic vulnerability and devised a new attack
named the common-identity attack that breaks existing privacy-reserving index systems.
A common identity is one that belongs to a person who has the data stored on almost all
providers in the network and its existence could potentially leak private information. I
proposed a technique based on the idea of mixing identities of different kinds in order to
provide quantitative privacy guarantees for the common identities.
In addition, I proposed a performance-optimized protocol to securely construct ǫ-PPI in
a mutually-untrusted network. For secure distributed computations, the common wisdom
is to use MPC or secure Multi-Party Computations [130, 95, 47]. MPC is very expensive
for bit-wise computations and directly applying MPC to our ǫ-PPI construction problem
would incur prohibitively high cost as an information network is typically large scaled in
the sense of both data size (e.g. a hospital may generates 1 TB data daily) and network
scale (e.g. in the U.S., there are around six thousand hospitals). The contribution that I
made in constructing ǫ-PPI is a performance-optimized protocol that requires no trusted
party. ǫ-PPI applies secret sharing schemes to reduce the amount of computation carried
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out by MPC; the insight is that secret sharing schemes, which protecting data secrecy, are
homomorphic to addition and much more efficient than the cryptographic MPC.
1.4.3 Optimizing Streaming Performance on Multi-core using Automatic Pipelining
In a cloud system, application servers would use multi-core machines to serve streaming
applications. A typical streaming application is modeled as an operator graph in which
each vertex represents a set of computations and each edge represents a data flow. Running
streaming applications with multiple cores requires the operator graph to be partitioned to
pieces of workloads, each piece scheduled on one core. To optimize the performance, the
goal is to prevent a so-called single-core bottleneck situation in which the whole system is
blocked by a single busy core while other cores are idling, which thus wastes resources. In
this case, the problem of streaming system optimization boils down to searching for the best
partitioning scheme that could evenly assign the streaming workload to the cores. Given a
large operator graph, there are a large number of possible ways in partitioning the graph,
which presents a huge search space for the best partitioning. Therefore, it is challenging to
find the optimal partitioning with low search overhead.
In this context, my contribution is an efficient search strategy for locally optimal parti-
tioning scheme with verified performance improvement. In a nutshell, my search strategy
is a combination of “white-box” and “black-box” approaches. The white-box approach
models the streaming application as an execution graph and searches for the optimal so-
lution efficiently based on a greedy strategy and heuristic-based utility. Given the search
result, it then tries the “black-box” approach; it verifies the performance gain when the
system is reconfigured based on the search result of the white-box approach. If it does not
improve the performance, then it would withdraw and try the second-optimal search result.
Otherwise, the new partitioning strategy stays.
The proposed technique, called Auto-pipelining [114], is implemented on IBM Stream
S, including a component for lightweight CPU utilization monitoring, a decision making
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framework based on the search algorithm, and an action taking component which substan-
tiates the partitioning strategy using Stream S’s native API.
1.5 Organization of the Dissertation
The reminder of this thesis dissertation is organized as follows.
Chapter II presents the ǫ-PPI framework for privacy-preserving search and indexing
over multiple data providers in the cloud.
Chapter III presents the HINDEX system for supporting big-data indexing on scalable
key-value stores in the cloud.
Chapter IV presents Auto-Pipelining which automatically optimizes the performance
of streaming applications on multi-core machines.
Chapter V presents a summary of my thesis research and discusses several open prob-
lems for future researches.
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CHAPTER II
ǫ-PPI: PRIVACY-PRESERVING SEARCH IN MULTI-DOMAIN
INFORMATION NETWORKS
An information network is a model for cloud computing, in which multiple service
providers are under different administrative domains and are mutually untrusted. In this
chapter, I describe the ǫ-PPI work which addresses the privacy issue when data needs to be
shared across the domain boundary in information networks in the cloud.
2.1 Introduction
In information networks, autonomous service providers store private personal records on
behalf of individual owners and enable information sharing under strict enforcement of
access control rules. Such information networks have the following salient features: 1)
Providers, each under a different administrative domain, do not mutually trust each other;
2) Providers have the responsibility of protecting owners’ privacy.
An example of the information network is the emerging HIE or Healthcare Informa-
tion Exchange systems (e.g. NHIN [24], GaHIN [6] and CommonWell [3]), in which
patients delegate their personal medical records to the hospitals that they visited and hospi-
tals form a nation-wide (or state-wide) network to share information. Specifically, different
hospitals may compete for the same customer base (i.e. patients) and have conflicting eco-
nomic interests, which renders it difficult to build full trust relationships between them.
Hospitals are responsible for protecting patient privacy, as regulated by Federal laws (e.g.
HiPAA [7]). Other examples of the multi-domain information networks include cross-
university online course management systems (e.g. Coursera [5] and StudIP [31]), dis-


















Figure 2: The system of PPI and information network
Information sharing is crucial for various applications in information networks. In the
HIE case, for example, when a patient who is unconscious is sent to a hospital, informa-
tion sharing between multiple hospitals can help the doctor retrieve the patient’s medical
history for immediate and accurate medical treatment. To establish information-sharing
sessions, Record Locator Service [4, 25] is a standard procedure in the existing HIE sys-
tems; it provides the ability to identify where a patient’s records are located based upon her
identity, and is used as the first step towards sharing information between the searcher and
the patient’s hospital of interest. Internally, a locator service maintains meta-data regarding
the patients’ medical history (i.e. the membership between a patient and a hospital). Such
meta-data is private and sensitive by itself; for example, the fact that a sports celebrity vis-
ited a hospital before is something that s/he wants to keep confidential since disclosing it
may jeopardize his/her future career. A locator service is usually hosted by an untrusted
third-party entity, mainly because of the difficulty to find a party unanimously trusted by all
the autonomous providers 1; for example, consider the U.S. government as a candidate, but
various scandals including the recent PRISM program [29] have made the government lose
the public trust. It is therefore desirable to preserve data privacy when the locator service
is hosted by an untrusted entity.
PPI techniques (i.e. privacy preserving index [45, 44, 131]) is promising for preserving
1In this chapter, we will use “provider” and “hospital” interchangeably.
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privacy of a locator service. The PPI design, while originally proposed in domains other
than information networks, could protect patient’s privacy regarding the medical-history
meta-data. When applying PPI for the locator service, the working (also elaborated in
Section 2.2) is a two-phase search procedure. Illustrated in Figure 2, a searcher for records
of a certain owner 2 first queries the PPI, and obtains a list of providers that may or may
not have the records of interest. Then for each provider in the list, the searcher attempts to
get authenticated and authorized before she can locally search the private records there. In
a PPI, the privacy preservation comes from the fact that a searcher may encounter in a PPI
result some noise providers (from which she does not find any matching data).
2.1.1 Quantitatively Personalized Privacy Preservation
While existing PPI’s have addressed privacy preservation, none of these approaches rec-
ognize the needs of personalized privacy, that is, to personalize privacy preservation for
different owners and providers. Recall that the privacy of a PPI system is about “an owner
tj has the records stored on provider pi”. It is evident that disclosing the private fact re-
garding different owners and providers causes different levels of privacy concerns. For
example, a woman may consider her visit to a women’s health center (e.g., for an abor-
tion) much more sensitive than her visit to a general hospital (e.g., for cough treatment).
Similarly, different owners may have different levels of concerns regarding their privacy:
While an average person may not care too much about his/her visit to a hospital, a celebrity
may be much more concerned about it, because even a small private matter of a celebrity
can be publicized by the media (e.g., by paparazzi). It is therefore critical to personalize
privacy protection in a PPI system. That being said, using existing PPI approaches can not
provide quantitative guarantees on the privacy preservation degree, let alone on a personal-
ized basis. The cause, largely due to the privacy-quality-agnostic way of constructing PPI
systems, is analyzed in Section 2.2.4.
2In this chapter we will use “owner” and “patient” interchangeably.
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In this chapter, we propose a new PPI abstraction for quantitatively personalized privacy
control, coined ǫ-PPI. Here, ǫ is a privacy-aware knob that allows each owner to mark a
personalized privacy level for a data unit delegated to the providers. Specifically, ǫj is a
value in a spectrum from 0 to 1, where value 0 is for the least privacy concern (in this case,
the PPI returns the list of the “true positive” providers who truly have the records of interest)
and value 1 for the best privacy preservation (in this case, PPI returns all providers, and a
search is essentially broadcast to the whole network). By this means, an attacker observing
the PPI search result can only have a bounded confidence by ǫ in successfully identifying a
true positive (and vulnerable) provider from the obscured provider list.
To construct the new ǫ-PPI from a network of mutually untrusted providers, we rely on
MPC technique (i.e., secure multi-party computation [95, 47, 79, 60]) which addresses the
input-data privacy in a generic computation process. However, by directly applying MPC
to our ǫ-PPI-construction problem, it raises performance issues. On the one hand, current
MPC platforms can only scale to small workloads [97]; they are practical only for simple
computation among few parties. On the other hand, a typical ǫ-PPI construction may in-
volve millions of owners and thousands of providers (e.g. in United States there are about
six thousand hospitals), which entails an intensive use of bit-wise MPC. It is therefore crit-
ical to devise a practical MPC protocol to efficiently carry out the ǫ-PPI construction. In
this regards, we propose to minimize the expensive MPC by using a parallel secure sum
protocol. The secure sum can be efficiently carried out by a proposed secret sharing scheme
with additive homomorphism. Based on the proposed MPC primitive, our index construc-
tion protocol protects providers’ privacy and can tolerate collusion of up to c providers (c
is configurable).
The contributions of this chapter are following:
• We propose ǫ-PPI that personalizes the privacy protection with quantitative guaran-
tees. The ǫ-PPI exposes a new delegate operation to owners, which allows them to
specify their different levels of privacy concerns. This new privacy knob, coined ǫ,
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can give quantitative privacy control while enabling information sharing.
• We propose ǫ-PPI construction protocol for an untrusted environment. As far as
we know, this is the first PPI construction protocol without assumption on trusted
parties or mutual trust relationships between providers. The performance of ǫ-PPI
construction protocol is extensively optimized by reducing the use of costly generic
MPC and using the proposed domain-specific protocols. The proposed construction
protocol is implemented and evaluated with verified performance superiority.
• We introduce a new privacy attack (called common-identity attack) that can break
generic PPI systems. The new attack model targets vulnerable common owners/pa-
tients who visited a large number of hospitals. Our proposed ǫ-PPI is the first to resist
common-identity attacks by using a proposed term-mixing protocol.
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 formulates the ǫ-PPI problem.
Section 2.3 and 2.4 respectively describe the computation model and distributed imple-
mentation of the ǫ-PPI construction protocol. Section 2.5 presents evaluation results, and
Section 2.6 surveys the related work before the conclusion in Section 4.11.
2.2 Problem Formulation
2.2.1 System Model
We formally describe our system model, which involves four entities: 1) a set of n data
owners, each of whom, identified by tj , holds a set of personal records, 2) an information
network consisting of m providers in which a provider pi is an autonomously operating
entity (e.g. a hospital), 3) a global PPI server in a third-party domain, 4) a data searcher
who wants to find all the records of an owner of interest. The interactions between these
four entities are formulated by the following four operations.
• Delegate(〈tj , ǫj〉, pi): A data owner tj can delegate his/her records to provider pi
based on the trust relationship (e.g. such trust can be built by the previous visit to
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a hospital). Along with the record delegation, the owner can specify her personal
preference in privacy by degree ǫj . Here ǫj indicates the level of privacy concerns,
ranging from 0 up to 1. For example, a VIP user (e.g. a celebrity patient in the
eHealthcare network) may want to set the privacy level at a high value while an
average patient may set the privacy level at a medium value 3.
• ConstructPPI({ǫj}): After data records are populated, all m providers in the net-
work join a procedure ConstructPPI to collectively construct the privacy preserving
index. The index construction should comply with owner-specified privacy degree
{ǫj}. As will be elaborated, the constructed PPI contains noises or false positives for
the purpose of privacy preservation and {ǫj} is materialized as the false positive rate
of owner tj .
• QueryPPI(tj)→ {pi}: At the service time, a searcher s, in the hope of finding owner
tj’s records, initiates a two-phase search procedure consisting of two operations,
QueryPPI(tj)→ {pi} and AuthSearch(s, {pi}, tj). This is illustrated in Figure 2.
The first phase involves with the locator service in which the searcher poses query
request, QueryPPI(tj), and the PPI server returns a list of providers {pi}who may or
may not have records of the requested owner tj . The query evaluation in PPI server
is trivial since the PPI, once constructed, contains the (obscured) mapping between
providers and owners.
• AuthSearch(s, {pi}, tj): The second phase in the search is for searcher s to contact
each provider in list {pi} (i.e. the result list from the first phase) and to find owner tj’s
records there. This process involves user authentication and authorization regarding
searcher s; we assume each provider has already set up its local access control sub-
system for authorized access to the private personal records. Only after authorization
3To prevent every owner from setting the highest value of ǫ, a possible solution is to charge more when
the owner sets a higher value of ǫj . It is reasonable since in a PPI system higher privacy settings comes with
more search overhead.
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can the searcher search the local repository on provider pi.
We describe the internal data model in a PPI. Each personal record contains an owner
identity tj
4 (e.g. the person’s name). As shown in Figure 3, a provider pi summarizes its
local record repository by a membership vector Mi(·); it indicates the list of owners who
have delegated their records on provider pi. For example, provider p0 who has records of
owner t0 and t1 maintains a membership vector as Mi = {t0 : 1, t1 : 1, t2 : 0}. In our
model, the same owner can have records spread across multiple providers (e.g., a patient
can visit multiple hospitals). The constructed PPI maintains a mapping between providers
and owners; it is essentially a combination of all provider-wise membership data, yet with
noises. The PPI mapping data is an m×n matrix M ′(·, ·), in which each row is of an owner,
each column of a provider and each cell of a Boolean value to indicate the membership/non-
membership of the owner to the provider. For the purpose of privacy preservation, there are
noises or false positives added in the matrix; for example, regarding provider p1 and owner
t0, value 1 in the published PPI M is a false positive in the sense that provider p1 does not
have any records of owner t0 but falsely claims to do so. The false positive value is helpful

























Figure 3: ǫ-PPI model
Table 1 summarizes the notations that will be used throughout the rest of the chapter.
4In this chapter, we use “owner” and “identity” interchangeably.
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2.2.2 Threat Model
Privacy goals: In our work, we are mainly concerned with the owner-membership pri-
vacy; for an owner tj , the owner-membership privacy is about which providers the owner
tj’s records belong to, that is, M(i, j) = 1
5. As mentioned, knowing this information,
one can learn about private personal knowledge. Other privacy goals related to the PPI
system but not addressed in this work include searcher anonymity and content privacy.
The searcher anonymity prevents an attacker from knowing which owner(s) a searcher has
searched for, which can be protected by various anonymity protocols [127]. The content
privacy [45] involves the detailed content of an owner’s record.
In order to attack the owner-membership privacy, we consider a threat model in which
an attacker can exploit multiple information sources through different channels. In partic-
ular, we consider the following privacy-threatening scenarios:
• Primary attack : The primary attack scenario is that an attacker randomly or inten-
tionally chooses a provider pi and an owner tj , and then claims that “owner tj has
delegated the records to provider pi”. To determine which providers and owners to
attack, the attacker learns about the publicly available PPI data M ′, and attacks only
those with M ′(i, j) = 1. Given an owner tj , the attacker can randomly or intention-
ally (e.g. by her prior knowledge) picks a provider pi so that M
′(i, j) = 1. To further
refine the attack and improve the confidence, the attacker can exploit other knowl-
edge through various channels, such as colluding providers. Due to space limit, we
5We use M·(·) and M(·, ·) interchangeably.
Table 1: Notations
Symbols of system model
tj The j-th owner (identity) n Number of owners
ǫj Privacy degree of tj
pi The i-th provider m Number of providers
Mi(·) Local vector of pi M ′(·, ·) Data matrix in the PPI
Symbols of ǫ-PPI construction
βj Publishing probability of tj σj Frequency of owner tj
λ Percentage of common owners fpj Achieved false positive rate of tj
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focus on the attack through the public channel in this chapter (the colluding attack
and analysis can be found in the tech report [115]).
• Common-identity attack : This attack focuses on the common identity which ap-
pears in almost all providers in the network. The attacker can learn about the truthful
frequency of owner identity σj from the public PPI matrix M
′ (as will be analyzed
many PPI’s [118, 45, 44] reveals the truthful frequency) and choose the owners with
high frequency. By this means, the attacker can have better confidence in succeeding
an attack. For example, consider the following extreme case: By learning an owner
identity is with frequency σj = 100%, the attacker can choose any provider and be
sure that the chosen provider must be a true positive (i.e., M(i, j) = 1).
This chapter focuses on attacks on a single owner, while a multi-owner attack boils
down to multiple single-owner attacks.
2.2.3 Privacy Metric and Degrees
Privacy metric: We measure the privacy disclosure by the attacker’s confidence that the
attack can succeed. Formally, given an attack on an owner tj and provider pi, we measure
the privacy disclosure by the probability that the attack can succeed, that is, Pr(M(i, j) =
1|M ′(i, j) = 1). To measure the privacy protection level of a specific owner tj , we use the
average probability of successful attacks against all possible providers that are subject to
M ′(i, j) = 1. The privacy metric is formulated as following.
Pr(M(·, j)|M ′(·, j)) = AVG
∀i,M ′(i,j)=1
(
Pr(M(i, j) = 1|M ′(i, j) = 1)
)
= 1− fpj
Here, fpj is the false positive rate of providers in the list of providers M
′(i, j) = 1.
The privacy disclosure metric on owner tj is equal to 1 − fpj , because the false positive
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providers determines the probability that an attack can succeed/fail. For example, if the list
{pi|M(i, j) = 1} is completely without any false positive providers (i.e. fpj = 0%), then
attacks on any provider can succeed, leading to 100% = 1 − fpj success probability/con-
fidence.
Based on the privacy metric, we further define four discrete privacy degrees. The def-
inition of privacy degrees are based on an information flow model of our privacy threat
model, in which an attacker obtains information from the information source through dif-
ferent channels.
• UNLEAKED: The information can not flow from the source (i.e. the original record
delegated to a provider), and the attacker can not know the information. This is the
highest privacy protection level.
• ǫ-PRIVATE: The information can flow to attackers through the channel of public PPI
data or PPI construction process. If this occurs, the PPI design protects privacy from
being disclosed. The PPI can provide a quantitative guarantee on the privacy leakage.
Formally, given a privacy degree ǫj , it requires the quantitative guarantee as follows.
Pr(M(·, j)|M ′(·, j)) ≤ 1− ǫj (1)
In particular, when ǫ = 0%, the attacker might be 100% confident about a successful
attack, and privacy is definitely leaked.
• NOGUARANTEE: The information can flow to the attacker and the PPI design can
not provide any guarantee on privacy leakage. That is, the achieved value of privacy
leakage metric may be unpredictable.
• NOPROTECT: The information can flow to the attacker and the PPI design does
not address the privacy preservation. That is, the privacy is definitely leaked and
the attack can succeed with 100% certainty. This is equivalent to the special case of
NOGUARANTEE where ǫj = 0%. This is the lowest level of privacy preservation.
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2.2.4 Analysis of Conventional PPIs
Based on our privacy model and metric, we analyze the privacy of existing PPI work and
compare it with ǫ-PPI. Here, we consider the primary attack and the common-term attack .
Before that, we briefly introduce the construction protocol of existing PPI. To be consistent
with terminology, we use term to refer to owner’s identity in this section, for example, the
common-identity attack is referred to as the common-term attack.
Grouping PPI: Inspired by k-anonymity [112], existing PPI work [45, 44, 118] con-
structs its index by using a grouping approach. The idea is to assign the providers into
disjoint privacy groups, so that true positive providers are mixed with the false positives in
the same group and are made indistinguishable. Then, a group reports binary value 1 on a
term tj as long as there is at least one provider in this group who possesses the term. For
example, consider terms are distributed in a raw matrix M as in Figure 3. If providers p2
and p3 are assigned to the same group, say g1, then in the published PPI group g1would
report to have term t0 and t2 but not t1, because both p2 and p3 do not have term t1.
2.2.4.1 Privacy under primary attack
To form privacy groups, existing PPIs randomly assign providers to groups. By this means,
the false positive rate resulted in the PPI varies non-deterministically. Furthermore, group-
ing based approach is fundamentally difficult to achieve per-term privacy degree. Because
different terms share the same group assignment, even if one can tune grouping strategy
(instead of doing it randomly) to meet privacy requirement for one or few terms, it would
be extremely hard, if not impossible, to meet the privacy requirement for thousands of
terms. For primary attack, the privacy leakage depends on the false positive rate of row at
term tj in PPI M
′. This way, the grouping based PPI can at best provide a privacy level
at NOGUARANTEE for primary attacks. Our experiments in Section 2.5.1.1 confirms our
analysis as well.
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2.2.4.2 Privacy under common-term attack
The grouping based PPI work may disclose the truthful term-to-provider distribution and
thus the identity of common terms. We use a specific example to demonstrate this vulnera-
bility.
An Example In an extreme scenario, one common term is with 100% frequency and all
other terms show up in only one provider. For group assignment, as long as there are more
than two groups, the rare terms can only show up in one group. In this case, the only
common term in M ′ is the true one in M , in spite of the grouping strategy. This allows the
attacker to be able to identify the true common terms in M and mount an attack against it
with 100% confidence.
Given information of term distribution, one can fully exploit the vulnerability to amount
common-term attacks. And the privacy degree depends on availability of term distribution
information. For certain existing PPI [118], it directly leaks the sensitive common term’s
frequency σj to providers during index construction, leading to a NOPROTECT privacy
level. Other PPI work, which does not leak exact term distribution information, still suffers
from data-dependent privacy protection, resulting in a NOGUARANTEE privacy level.
We can summarize the analysis of prior work in Table 2.
Table 2: Comparison of ǫ-PPI against existing PPI’s
Primary attack Common-identity attack
PPI [45, 44] NOGUARANTEE NOGUARANTEE
SS-PPI [118] NOGUARANTEE NOPROTECT
ǫ-PPI ǫ-PRIVATE ǫ-PRIVATE
2.2.5 Index Construction of Quantitative Privacy Preservation
In the ǫ-PPI, we aim at achieving ǫ-PRIVATE on a per-identity basis (i.e. personalizing
privacy preservation for different owners). The formal problem that this chapter addresses
is the index construction with quantitative privacy preservation, which is stated as below.
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Proposition 2.2.1. Consider a network with m providers and n owners; each provider pi
has a local Boolean vector Mi of its membership of n owners. Each owner tj has a pre-
ferred level of privacy preservation ǫj . The problem of quantitatively personalized privacy
preservation is to construct a PPI that can bound any attacker’s confidence (measured by
our per-owner privacy metric) under ǫj , with regards to all attacks on owner tj as described
in our threat model.
2.3 ǫ-PPI Construction: Computation
Our ǫ-PPI construction is based on a proposed two-phase framework in which providers
first collectively calculate a global value β, and then each provider independently pub-
lishes its local vector randomly based on probability β. This framework requires complex
computations. In this section, we introduce them at different granularity: We first overview
our two-phase construction framework and then introduce the first phase (called the β cal-
culation) in details. At last, we conduct the privacy analysis.
2.3.1 A Two-Phrase Construction Framework
We propose a two-phase framework for the ǫ-PPI construction. First, for each owner iden-
tity tj , all m providers collectively calculate a probability value βj . In the second phase,
the private membership value regarding owner tj and every provider pi is published. In
this paragraph, we assume βj is already calculated and we focus on describing the second
phase – how to use βj to publish private data. Recall that in our data model, each provider
pi has a Boolean value M(i, j) that indicates the membership of owner tj in this provider.
After knowing value of βj , provider pi starts to publish this private Boolean value by ran-
domly flipping it at probability βj . To be specific, given a membership Boolean value (i.e.
M(i, j) = 1), it is always truthfully published as 1, that is, M ′(i, j) = 1. Given a non-
membership value (i.e. M(i, j) = 0), it is negated to M ′(i, j) = 1 at probability βj . We
call the negated value as the false positive in the published ǫ-PPI. The following formula
describes the randomized publication. Note when Boolean value M(i, j) = 1, it is not
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1, with probability β
0, with probability 1− β
1 → 1 (2)
The truthful publication rule (i.e. 1 → 1) guarantees that relevant providers are always
in the QueryPPI result and the 100% query recall is ensured. The false-positive publica-
tion rule (i.e. 0 → 1) adds noises or false positives to the published PPI which can help
obscure the true owner-to-provider membership and thus preserves owner-membership pri-
vacy. For multiple owners, different β’s are calculated and the randomized publication runs
independently.
An example: Consider the case in Figure 3. For owner t0, if β0 is calculated to be 0.5,
then provider p1 would publish its negative membership value M1(0) = 0 as value 1 with
probability 0.5. In this example, it is flipped and the constructed ǫ-PPI contains M ′(1, 0) =
1. Similarly for identity t2 and provider p0, it is also subject to flipping at probability β2.
In this example, it is not flipped, and the constructed ǫ-PPI contains M ′(0, 2) = 0.
2.3.2 The β Calculation
In the randomized publication, βj determines the amount of false positives in the published
ǫ-PPI. For quantitative privacy preservation, it is essential to calculate a βj value that makes
the false positive amount meet the privacy requirement regarding ǫj . In this part, we focus
on describing the calculation of β which serves as the first phase in ǫ-PPI construction
process. Concretely we consider two cases: the common identity case and the non-common
identity case. Recall that the common identity refers to such an owner who delegates her
records to almost all providers in the network. The general PPI construction is vulnerable
to the common-identity attack and it needs to be specially treated.
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2.3.2.1 The Case of Non-common Identity
In the case of non-common identity, negative providers suffice to meet the desired privacy
degree. We consider the problem of setting value βj for identity tj in order to meet the
desired ǫj . Recall the randomized publication: Multiple providers independently runs an
identical random process, and this can be modeled as a series of Bernoulli trials (note that
the publishing probability β(tj) is the same to all providers). Our goal is to achieve privacy
requirement that fpj ≥ ǫj with high level success ratio pp, that is, pp = Pr(fpj ≥ ǫj).
Under this model, we propose three policies to calculate β with different quantitative guar-
antees: a basic policy βb that guarantees fpj ≥ ǫj with 50% probability, and an incremented
expectation based policy βd, and a Chernoff bound based policy βc that guarantees fpj ≥ ǫj
with γ probability where success ratio γ can be configured.
Basic policy: The basic policy sets the β value so that the expected amount of false
positives among m providers is satisfactory, that is, be at least ǫj ·m(1− σj). Formally,
ǫj =
(1− σj) · βb(tj)
(1− σj) · βb(tj) + σj
⇒ βb(tj) = [(σ−1j − 1)(ǫ−1j − 1)]−1 (3)
The basic policy has poor quality in attaining the desired privacy preservation; the actual
value fpj is bigger than ǫj with only 50% success ratio.
Incremented expectation-based policy: The incremented expectation-based approach
is to increase the expectation-based βb(tj) by a constant value, that is,
βd(tj) = βb(tj) + ∆ (4)
Incremental ∆ can be configurable based on the quality requirement; the bigger the value
is, the higher success ratio pp is expected to attain. However, there is no direct connection
between the configured value of ∆ and the success ratio pp that can be achieved, leaving it
a hard task to figure out the right value of ∆ based on desired pp.
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Chernoff bound-based policy: Toward an effective policy to calculate β, we apply the
Chernoff bounds to the randomized publication process which is modeled as Bernoulli
trials. This policy allows direct control of the success ratio. Formally, it has the property
described in Theorem 2.3.1.





βc(tj) ≥ βb(tj) +Gj +
√
G2j + 2βb(tj)Gj (5)
Then, randomized publication with β(tj) = βc(tj) statistically guarantees that the pub-
lished ǫ-PPI can meet privacy requirement fpj ≥ ǫj with success ratio larger than γ.
Proof. We model the problem as Bernoulli trials and prove the theorem by applying Cher-
noff bound. For a term tj , the total number of false positive providers is modeled as the sum
of T = m(1−σj) Bernoulli trials, because there are m(1−σj) negative providers for term
tj and each negative provider independently and randomly publishes its own bit, a process
that can be modeled as a single Bernoulli trials. In the trial, when the negative provider be-
comes a false positive (i.e., 0→ 1) which occurs at probability β(tj), the Bernoulli random
variable, denoted by X , takes on value 1. Otherwise, it takes the value 0. Let E(X) be the
expectation of variable X , which in our case is,
E(X) = m(1− σj) · β(tj) (6)
We can apply the Chernoff bound for the sum of Bernoulli trials, Pr(X ≤ (1− δ)E(X)) ≤
e−δ
2E(X)/2 [96], where δ > 0 is any positive number. For term tj , the expected success
rate, denoted by pp(tj), is equal to the probability of a publication success, that is, pp(tj) =




pp(tj) = 1− Pr(fpj ≤ ǫj)
= 1− Pr(X ≤ m σj
ǫ−1j − 1
)
≥ 1− e−δ2jm(1−σj)β(tj )/2 (7)
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In here, δj = 1 − 1(ǫ−1j −1)(σ−1j −1) ·
1
β(tj)
= 1 − βb(tj)
β(tj)
. Recall that γ is the required minimal
success rate. If we can have
1− e−δ2jm(1−σj)β(tj )/2 ≥ γ (8)
for all indexed terms, then ∀j, pp(tj) ≥ γ. This means in the case of large number of terms,
the percentage of successfully published terms or pp is expected to be larger than or equal
















= Gj , and βc(tj) should be bigger than βb(tj) since success ratio is larger
than 50%. Solving the inequality and taking only the solution that satisfies βc(tj) > βb(tj),
we have,
βc(tj) ≥ βb(tj) +Gj +
√
G2j + 2βb(tj)Gj
2.3.2.2 The Case of Common Identities
With the above β calculation for non-common identities, the constructed ǫ-PPI is vulnera-
ble to the common-identity attack. Because the β∗
6 bears information of identity frequency
σj , and during our index construction framework, β needs to be released to all participat-
ing providers. A colluding provider would release such information to the attacker who
can easily obtain the truthful identity frequency σ (e.g., from Equation 3 assuming ǫj is
publicly known) and effectively formulates the common-identity attack.
To defend against the common-identity attack, ǫ-PPI construction employs an identity-
mixing technique for common identities. The idea is to mix common identities with certain
non-common identities by exaggerating the calculated βj (i.e. falsely increasing certain
6We use β∗ to denote the probability value calculated by any of the three policies for non-common
identities.
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βj to 100%) from which one can not distinguish common identities from the rest. To be
specific, for a non-common identity tj , we allow its βj to be exaggerated to 100% with


























, β∗ < 1
1, β∗ ≥ 1
(9)
Given a set of common identities, we need to determine how many non-common iden-
tities should be chosen for mixing, in other words, to determine the value of λ. While a big
value of λ can hide common identities among the non-common ones, it incurs unnecessarily
high search cost. On the other hand, a value of λ which is too small would leave common
identities unprotected and vulnerable. In ǫ-PPI, we use the following heuristic-based policy
to calculate λ.
• In the set of mixed identities, the percentage of non-common identities should be
no smaller than ξ. Since there are
∑
β∗≥1

























2.3.2.3 β Calculation: Putting It Together
We summarize the β calculation in the ǫ-PPI construction. For each identity tj , β(tj)
is calculated based on Equation 9, which follows the computation flows as below. The
underline symbol indicates the variable is private and⇒ indicates the computation is fairly
complex and heavy (e.g. involving square root when calculating β∗).




1 → Common id percentage λ→ Final probability β
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2.3.3 Privacy Analysis of Constructed ǫ-PPI
We present the privacy analysis of the constructed ǫ-PPI under our threat model.
Privacy under primary attack: The property of the three policies of calculating β∗ sug-
gests that the false positive rate in the published ǫ-PPI should be no smaller than ǫj in a
statistical sense. Recall that the false positive rate bounds the attacker’s confidence; it im-
plies that ǫ-PPI achieves an ǫ-PRIVATE degree against the primary attack. It is noteworthy
that our ǫ-PPI is fully resistant to repeated attacks against the same identity over time, be-
cause the ǫ-PPI is static; once constructed and having privacy protected, it stays the same.
Privacy under common-identity attack: For the common-identity attack, the attacker’s
confidence in choosing a true common identity depends on the percentage of true common
identities among the (mixed) common identities in the published ǫ-PPI. Therefore the pri-
vacy preservation degree is bounded by the percentage of false positives (in this case, it
depends on the percentage of the non-common identities which is mixed and published as
common identities in the published ǫ-PPI), which equals ξ. By properly setting λ, we can
have ξ = max∀tj∈{common identities} ǫj . By this way, it is guaranteed to achieve the per-identity
ǫ-PRIVATE degree against the common-identity attack.
2.4 ǫ-PPI Construction: Realization
This section describes the design and implementation of a distributed and secure protocol
that realizes the computation of ǫ-PPI construction described in the previous section.
2.4.1 Challenge and Design
The goal of our protocol is to efficiently and securely compute the publishing probability
{βj} among a set of mutually untrusted providers who are reluctant to exchange the private
membership vector with others. The computation is based secure multi-party computation
(or MPC) that protects the input-data privacy. It is challenging to construct ǫ-PPIusing
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MPC in a large information network. On the one hand, current techniques for MPC only
support small computation workloads [97]. On the other hand, the computation required
in ǫ-PPI construction is big and complex; the computation model involves large number of
identities and providers; even for a single identity it involves fairly complex computation
(e.g., square root and logarithm as in Equation 5). This poses a huge challenge to design a
practical protocol for secure ǫ-PPI construction.
To address the above challenge, we propose an efficient and secure construction proto-
col based on the principle of minimizing the secure computation. Given a computation flow
in Equation 11, our protocol design has three salient features: 1) It separates the secure and
non-secure computations by the last appearance of private variables in the flow (note that
the computation flows from the private data input to the end of non-private result). 2) It re-
orders the computation to minimize the expensive secure computation. The idea is to push
down complex computation towards the non-private end. To be specific, instead of first
carrying out complex floating point computations for raw probability β, as in Formula 11,
we push such computations down through the flow and pull up the obscuring computations
for private input, as in Formula 12. 3) To scale to a large number of providers, we propose












→ β = 1
⇒ β = β∗
(12)
2.4.2 The Distributed Algorithm
Following our design, we propose a practical distributed algorithm to run the two-phase
ǫ-PPI construction. The overall workflow is illustrated in Figure 4. For simplicity, we
focus on phase 1 for β calculation. The β calculation is realized in two stages by itself:
As illustrated in Algorithm 1, the first stage is a SecSumShare protocol which, given m
input Boolean from the providers, outputs c secret shares whose sum is equal to the sum
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of these m Boolean. Here, c is the number of shares that can be configurable based on
the tolerance on provider collusion. The output c shares have the security property that a
party knowing x < c shares can not deduce any information about the sensitive sum of
m Boolean. For different identities, the SecSumShare protocol runs multiple instances
independently and in parallel, which collectively produce c vectors of shares, denoted by
s(i, ·), where i ∈ [0, c − 1]. The c vectors are distributed to c coordinate providers (for
simplicity we assume they are providers p0, . . . , pc−1) on which the second-stage protocol,
CountBelow, is run. As shown by Algorithm 2, given c vectors s(0, ·), . . . s(c − 1, ·) and
a threshold t, the CountBelow algorithm sums them to vector
∑
i s(i, ·) and counts the
number of elements that are bigger than t.
Table 3: Distributed algorithms for ǫ-PPI construction
Algorithm 1 calculate-beta(M0, . . .Mn−1)
1: {s(0, ·), . . . s(c− 1, ·)} ← SecSumShare(M0, . . .Mn−1)
2: σ′(·) is calculated under condition β∗ = 1, by either Equation 3, or 4 or 5.
3:
∑
σ≥σ′ 1←CountBelow(s(0, ·), . . . s(c− 1, ·), σ′(·) ·m)
4: {β0, . . . βm−1} ←
∑
σ≥σ′ 1 ⊲ By Equation 12
Algorithm 2 CountBelow(s(0, ·), . . . s(c− 1, ·), threshold t)
1: count← 0
2: for ∀j ∈ [0,m− 1) do
3: S[j]←∑i s(i, j)





2.4.2.1 Distributed Algorithm for SecSumShare
We use an example in the top box in Figure 4 to illustrate the distributed algorithm of
SecSumShare. In the example c = 3 and there are five providers p0, . . . p4. The example
focuses on a single identity case for tj (e.g. j = 0). Out of the 5 providers, p1 and p2
have records of owner t0 (i.e., M(1, 0) = M(2, 0) = 1). SecSumShare requires modular
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Phase 1.2: Calculate β






Figure 4: An example of ǫ-PPI construction algorithm
1 Generating shares: each provider pi decomposes its private input Boolean M(i, j)
into c shares, denoted by {S(i, j, k)}, with k ∈ [0, c− 1]. The first c − 1 shares are
randomly picked from interval [0, q] and the last share is deterministically chosen so
that the sum of all shares equals the input Boolean M(i, 0) in modulo q. That is,
(
∑
k∈[0,c] S(i, j, k)) mod q = M(i, j). In Figure 4, as depicted by arrows 1 , p0’s
input M(0, 0) is decomposed to c = 3 shares, {S(0, 0, k)|k} = {2, 3, 0}. It ensures
(2 + 3 + 0) mod 5 = 0.
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2 Distributing shares: each provider pi then distributes its shares to the next c − 1
neighbor providers; k-th shares S(i, j, k) will be sent out to k-th successor of provider
pi, that is, p(i+k) mod m. As shown by arrows 2 in Figure 4, p0 keeps the first share
2 locally, sends its second share 3 to its successor p1 and the third share 0 to its 2-hop
successor p2.
3 Summing shares: each provider then sums up all shares she has received in the pre-
vious step to obtain the super-share. In Figure 4, after the step of share distribution,
provider p0 receives 3 from p3, 4 from p4 and 2 from herself. As depicted by arrows
3 , the super-share is calculated to be 3 + 4 + 2 mod 5 = 4.
4 Aggregating super-shares: each provider sends its super-share to a set of c coordi-
nators. These coordinators receiving super-shares then sum the received shares up
and output the summed vector s(i, ·) to the next-stage CountBelow protocol. In Fig-
ure 4, provider p0, p1, p2 are chosen as coordinators and arrow 4 shows that the sum
of super-shares on provider p0 is s(0, 0) = (4 + 2) mod 5 = 1. The sum of all the
values on coordinators should be equal to the number of total appearances of identity
t0. That is, 1 + 4+ 2 mod 5 = 2. Note that there are two providers with identity t0.
This total appearance number or identity frequency may be sensitive (in the case of
common identity) and can not be disclosed immediately, which is why we need the
second stage protocol, CountBelow.
2.4.2.2 Implementation of CountBelow computation
The secure computation of CountBelow (in Algorithm 2) is implemented by using a
generic MPC protocol. Each party corresponds to a coordinate provider in the ǫ-PPI sys-
tem. Specifically, we choose a Boolean-circuit based MPC protocol FairplayMP [47] for
implementation. Since Algorithm 2 is implemented by expensive MPC it normally be-
comes the bottleneck of the system; in practice, c ≪ m and thus the network can scale to
large number of providers m while the MPC is still limited to a subset of the network.
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2.4.3 Privacy Analysis of Constructing ǫ-PPI
We analyze the privacy preservation of ǫ-PPI construction process. We mainly consider
a semi-honest model, which is consistent with the existing MPC work [47]. The privacy
analysis is conducted from three aspects: 1) The privacy guarantee of SecSumShare
protocol. It guarantees: 1.1) (2c − 3)-secrecy of input privacy [118]: With less than c
providers in collusion, none of any private input can be learned by providers other than
its owner. 1.2) c-secrecy of output privacy: The private sum can only be reconstructed
when all c shares are used. With less than c shares, one can learn nothing regarding the
private sum. The output privacy is formally presented in Theorem 2.4.1. 2) The security
and privacy of CountBelow relies on that of the MPC used in implementation. The generic
MPC technique can provide information confidentiality against c colluding providers [47].
3) The final output β does not carry any private information, and is safe to be released to
the (potentially untrusted) providers for the randomized publication.
Theorem 2.4.1. The SecSumShare’s output is a (c, c) secret sharing scheme. Specifi-
cally, for an owner tj , SecSumShare protocol outputs c shares, {s(i, j)|∀i ∈ [0, c− 1]},
whose sum is the secret vj . The c shares have the following properties.
• Recoverability: Given c output shares, the secret value vj (i.e. the sum) can be easily
reconstructed.
• Secrecy: Given any c − 1 or fewer output shares, one can learn nothing about the
secret value, in the sense that the value’s conditional distribution given the known
shares is the same as the prior distribution,
∀x ∈ Zq, P r(vj = x) = Pr(vj = x|V ⊂ {s(i, j)})
where V is any proper subset of {s(i, j)}.
Proof. Recoverability can be trivially proved based on the fact that
∑
∀i∈[0,c−1] s(i, j) = vj .
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To prove secrecy, we examine the process of generating super-shares s(i, j). It is easy to
see that the SecSumShare protocol uses a (c, c) secret sharing to split each private input
M(i, j). The generated c shares for each input value are distributed to c different output
super-shares. For each private input M(i, j), an output super share s(i, j) has included one
and only one share from it. Therefore, when an adversary knows at most c− 1 outputs, at
least one share of each private input is still unknown to her. This leaves the value of any
input completely undetermined to this adversary, thus the secret or the sum of input values
completely undetermined.
2.5 Experiments
To evaluate the proposed ǫ-PPI, we have done two set of experiments: The first set, based
on simulations, evaluates how effective the ǫ-PPI can be in terms of delivering quantitative
privacy protection. The second set evaluates the performance of our index construction
protocol. For realistic performance results, we have implemented a functioning prototype
for ǫ-PPI construction.
2.5.1 Effectiveness of Privacy Preservation
Experimental setup: To simulate the information network, we use a distributed docu-
ment dataset [94] of 2, 500 − 25, 000 small digital libraries, each of which simulates a
provider in our problem setting. To be specific, this dataset defines a “collection” table,
which maintains the mapping from the documents to collections. The documents are fur-
ther derived from NIST’s publicly available TREC-WT10g dataset [77]. To adapt to our
problem setting, each collection is treated as a provider and the source web URLs (as de-
fined in TREC-WT10g dataset) of the documents are treated as owner’s identity. If not
otherwise specified, we use no more than 10, 000 providers in the experiments. Using the
collection table, it also allows us to emulate the membership matrix M . The dataset does
not have a privacy metric for the query phrase. In our experiment, we randomly generate
the privacy degree ǫ in the domain [0, 1]. We use a metric, success ratio, to measure the
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effectiveness. The success ratio is the percentage of identities whose false positive rates in
the constructed PPI are no smaller than the desired rate ǫj .
2.5.1.1 ǫ-PPI versus Existing Grouping-based PPI’s
The experiments compare ǫ-PPI with existing PPI’s. The existing PPI’s [45, 44, 118] are
based on a grouping technique; providers are organized into disjoint privacy groups so
that different providers from the same group are indistinguishable from the searchers. By
contrast, ǫ-PPI does not utilize grouping technique and is referred to in this section as a non-
grouping approach. In the experiment, we measure the success ratio of privacy preserva-
tion, and search performance. Grouping PPI’s are tested under different group sizes. Given
a network of fixed providers, we use the group number to change average group size. We
test grouping PPI with the Chernoff bound-based and the incremented expectation-based
policies under the default setting. The expected false positive rate is configured at 0.8, and
the number of providers is 10, 000. We uniformly sample 20 times and report the average
results.
Results are illustrated in Figure 5. Non-grouping PPI generally performs much better
and more stable than the grouping approach in terms of success ratio. With proper config-
uration (e.g. ∆ = 0.01 for incremental expectation-based policy and γ = 0.9 for Chernoff
policy), the non-grouping ǫ-PPI always achieves near-optimal success ratio (i.e. 1.0). By
contrast, the grouping PPI’s display instability in their success ratio. For example, as shown
by the “Grouping (#groups 2000)” series in Figure 5a, the success ratio fluctuates between
0.0 and 1.0, which renders it difficult to provide a guarantee to the system and owners.
The reason is that with 2000 groups, sample space in each group is too small (i.e., with
50 providers) to hold a stable result for success ratio. When varying ǫ, similar behavior is
shown in Figure 5b; the success ratio of grouping PPI’s quickly degrades to 0, leading to
unacceptable privacy quality. This is due to the grouping design of PPI that is agnostic to
different owners. This set of experiments shows that the privacy degree of non-grouping
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PPI’s can be effectively tuned, implying the ease of a practical use.
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Figure 5: Comparing non-grouping and grouping
2.5.1.2 Comparing different β-calculation policies
We evaluate and compare the effectiveness of three β-calculation policies with ǫ-PPI. In
the experiments, we tested various parameter settings and show the representative results at
the following settings: ∆ = 0.02 as in the incremented expectation-based policy, expected
success ratio γ = 0.9 as in the Chernoff bound based policy. The default false positive
rate is set at ǫ = 0.5. The experiment results measuring the success ratio are reported in
Figure 6. In Figure 6a, we vary the identity frequency from near 0 to about 500 providers
with totally 10, 000 providers in the network. In Figure 6b we vary the number of providers
and set the identity frequency to be constant 0.1. It can be seen from the results that while
the Chernoff bound-based policy (with γ = 0.9) always achieves near-optimal success
ratio (i.e., close to 1.0), the other two policies fall short in certain cases; the expectation-
based policy is not configurable and achieves the success rate only at 0.5. This is expected
because the expectation-based approach works on an average sense. For the incremented
expectation-based policy, its success ratio, though approaching 1.0 in some cases, is much
smaller than 1.0 and unsatisfactory in other cases (e.g. for terms of high frequency as in
Figure 6a and for few providers as in Figure 6b). On the other hand, the high-level privacy
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preservation of the Chernoff bound policy comes with reasonable search overhead. The
related experiment results can be found in technical report [115].




























(a) Varying frequency under 10, 000 providers




























(b) Varying provider numbers under frequency 0.1
Figure 6: Quality of privacy preservation
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2.5.2 Performance of Index Construction
Experimental setup: We evaluate the performance of our distributed ǫ-PPI construction
protocol. Towards that, we have implemented a functioning prototype. The CountBelow
is implemented by using an MPC software, FairplayMP [47], which is based on Boolean
circuits. The implemented CountBelow protocol is written in SFDL, a secure function
definition language exposed by FairplayMP, and is compiled by the FairplayMP runtime to
Java code, which embodies the generated circuit for secure computation. We implement
the SecSumShare protocol in Java. In particular, we use a third-party library Netty [22]
for network communications and Google’s protocol buffer [30] for object serialization. We
conduct experiments on a number of machines in Emulab [18, 126], each equipped with
a 2.4 GHz 64-bit Quad Core Xeon processor and 12 GB RAM. In the experiments, the
number of machines tested is varied from 3 to 9 (due to limited resource at hand). For
each experiment, the protocol is compiled to and run on the same number of parties. Each
party is mapped to one dedicated physical machine. The experiment uses a configuration
of c = 3.
To justify the standpoint of our design that MPC is expensive, we compare our MPC-
reduced approach as in the ǫ-PPI construction protocol against a pure MPC approach. The
pure MPC approach does not use the SecSumShare protocol to reduce the number of
parties in the generic MPC part and directly accepts inputs from the m providers. The
metric used in the experiment is the start-to-end execution time, which is the time duration
from when the protocol starts to run to when the last machine reports to finish. The result
is shown as in Figure 7a. It can be seen that the pure MPC approach generally incurs
longer execution time than our MPC-reduced approach (used in ǫ-PPI construction): As
the information network grows large, while the execution time of pure MPC approach
increases super-linearly, that of MPC-reduced approach increases slowly. This difference
is due to the fact that the MPC in our MPC-reduced approach is fixed to c parties and does
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not change as the number of providers m grows. And the parallel SecSumShare in MPC-
reduced approach is scalable in m as well, since each party runs in constant rounds, and
each round sends a constant number (at most c−1) of messages to its neighbors. For scaling
with more parties, we use the metric of circuit size, which is the size of the compiled MPC
program. As a valid metric, the circuit size determines the execution time7 in real runs. By
this means, we can show the scalability result of up to 60 parties as in Figure 7b. Similar
performance improvement can be observed except that the circuit size grows linearly with
the number of parties involved. Finally, we also study the scalability from running the
protocol with multiple identities in a three-party network. The result in Figure 7c shows
that ǫ-PPI construction grows with the number of identities at a much slower rate than that
of the pure MPC approach.
2.6 Related Work
2.6.1 Privacy-Preserving Data Indexing
Non-encryption based PPI: PPI is designed to index access controlled contents scat-
tered across multiple content providers. While being stored on an untrusted server, PPI
aims at preserving the content privacy of all participant providers. Inspired by the privacy
definition of k-anonymity [112], existing PPI work [45, 44, 118] follows the grouping-
based approach; it organizes providers into disjoint privacy groups, such that providers
from the same group are indistinguishable to the searchers. To construct such indexes,
many existing approaches [45, 44, 46] assume providers are willing to disclose their pri-
vate local indexes, an unrealistic assumption when there is a lack of mutual trust between
providers. SS-PPI [118] is proposed with resistance against colluding attacks. While most
existing grouping PPI’s utilize a randomized approach to form groups, its weakness is
studied in SS-PPI but without a viable solution. Though the group size can be used to
7Regarding the detailed definition of circuit size and the exact correlation between circuit size and execu-
tion time, it can be found in FairplayMP [47].
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configure grouping-based PPI’s, it lacks per-owner concerns and quantitative privacy guar-
antees. Moreover, organizing providers in groups usually leads to query broadcasting (e.g,
with positive providers scattered in all groups), rendering search performance inefficient.
By contrast, ǫ-PPI is a brand new PPI abstraction without grouping (i.e. non-grouping PPI
as mentioned before), which provides quantitative privacy control on a per-owner basis.
Index with search-able encryption: Building search-able indexes over encrypted data
has been widely studied in the context of both symmetric key cryptography [109] and public
key cryptography [125, 92, 51]. In this architecture, content providers build their local
indices and encrypt all the data and indices before submitting them to the untrusted server.
During query time, the searcher first gets authenticated and authorized by the corresponding
content provider; the searcher then contacts the untrusted server and searches against the
encrypted index. This system architecture makes the assumption that a searcher already
knows which provider possesses the data of her interest, which is unrealistic in the PPI
scenario. Besides, unlike the encryption-based system, performance is a motivating factor
behind the design of our PPI, by making no use of encryption during the query serving
time.
2.6.2 Secure Distributed Computations
Practical MPC: Recently a large body of research work [95, 47, 79, 60, 35] is dedi-
cated towards a practical MPC platform. Traditional work for generic MPC largely falls
under two models, the garbled functions used for Boolean circuits and the homomorphic
encryption used for arithmetic calculation. Towards efficient and practical MPC systems,
Fairplay [95, 47] implements the computation of Boolean circuits for two or more parties,
and VIFF [60] is a runtime for the computation of arithmetic circuits. MightBeEvil [80]
supports efficient two-party computation via garbled circuit. Based on the observation
that different computation models can lead to performance gain for different workloads,
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TASTY [79] proposes to use a modular and adaptive design which divides the whole work-
load into several modules and accordingly maps the modular workload to to a specific MPC
model. It is realized by a scheme that can convert the encrypted or garbled data between
modules. Recent work [35] extends the domain of practical MPC (from integers) to floating
point numbers by using Shamir’s secret sharing.
Privacy-preserving multi-source analysis: Based on the primitive provided by MPC,
there is a large body of research work on privacy-preserving analysis of multi-source data.
We briefly survey this research area. Private record linkage (or PRL) [64, 98] is impor-
tant in the health information exchanges. The task of PRL is to identify medical records
of the same patient which are with semantically heterogeneous demographic information
and are distributed across multiple Healthcare providers. In industry, Master Patient In-
dexes [23, 25] are real-world systems that recently emerge to support PRL. In the research
community, privacy-preserving PRL schemes are recently proposed [89, 90]. The PRL
technique is complementary to our ǫ-PPI in the sense that they could work together to
support a federated search service for patient medical history based on heterogeneously
distributed patient data. In the domain of corporate IT business, prior work [58] proposes
a privacy-preserving framework for analyzing OLAP workloads for business intelligence
(or BI). For data sharing between multiple corporate entities, DJoin [97] is proposed for
privacy-preserving join computation. To address the inefficiency of generic MPC, DJoin
uses an efficient but domain-specific primitive for set operations [86] in combination with
MPC. In similar spirit, our ǫ-PPI construction protocol reduces the expensive MPC by ap-
plying the efficient secure-sharing technique.
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2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we propose ǫ-PPI for personalized privacy control with quantitative guar-
antee. ǫ-PPI allows each data owner to specify her personal preference in privacy preser-
vation, and ǫ-PPI can guarantee that such personalized privacy can be preserved in a quan-
titative fashion. In the design of ǫ-PPI, we identify a vulnerability of generic PPI systems,
the common-identity attack. We propose an identity-mixing mechanism to protect ǫ-PPI
against such attacks. We have implemented the construction protocol for ǫ-PPI without any
trusted party involved. We optimize the performance of secure index construction protocol
by minimizing the use of expensive MPC. We have built a generic privacy threat model and
performed security analysis which shows the advantages of ǫ-PPI over other PPI system in
terms of privacy preservation quality.
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HINDEX: SUPPORTING BIG-DATA INDEX ON SCALABLE
KEY-VALUE STORES IN A CLOUD
Big-data storage in the cloud is largely handled by scalable key-value stores nowadays.
Key-value stores, exposing a Put/Get API, allow only for key-based data access. In this
chapter, I describe my HINDEX work that supports secondary index on write-optimized
key-value stores with efficiency.
3.1 Introduction
In the age of cloud computing, various scalable systems emerge and prevail for big data
storage and management. These scalable data stores, mostly called key-value stores, in-
clude Google’s BigTable [53], Amazon’s Dynamo [62], Facebook’s Cassandra [91, 9],
Apache HBase [14] among many others. They expose simple Put/Get API which allows
only key-based data accesses, in the sense that when writing/reading data in the key-value
stores, users are required to specify a data key as the parameter. While the key-based
Put/Get API supports basic workloads, it falls short when it comes to more advanced web
and database applications which require value-based data access. To gain wider applica-
tion, it calls for value-based API support on the key-value stores.
On the other hand, many key-value stores deal with write-intensive big data. Typically,
the workload against a key-value store is dominated by data writes (i.e. Put) rather than
reads, and such kind of workloads is prevalent in modern web applications. For instance,
in Web 2.0, social users not only read news but also contribute their own thinking and write
news themselves. It is also the case in other emerging domains, such as large system mon-
itoring and online financial trading. To optimize the write performance, many key-value
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stores (e.g. HBase, Cassandra and BigTable) follow a log-structured merge design [99],
in which on-disk data layout is organized to several sorted files and writes are optimized
by an append-only design. We call these Log-structured Key-Value Stores as LSKV stores
(whose distinctive features are described in § 3.2).
This work addresses the problem of supporting a value-based API on the write-
intensive data stored in LSKV store. For value-based access, a secondary index is es-
sential. In common practice, the secondary index is materialized as a regular table in the
underlying LSKV store. In this situation, the index maintenance under a write-intensive
workload is a challenge: On the one hand, the index maintenance needs to be lightweight
in order for it to catch up with the high arrival rate of the incoming data writes; On the
other hand, given multi-version data model in LSKV store, the index maintenance needs
to find and delete old versions (in order to keep the index fresh and up-to-date), a task that
includes Get operations and is very expensive in LSKV storesystems (explained in § 3.2).
In this chapter, we propose HINDEX, a middleware system that supports secondary
index on top of an LSKV store. To address the index-maintenance challenge, we propose a
performance-aware approach. The core idea is to decompose the index maintenance task to
several sub-tasks, and only to execute the inexpensive ones synchronously while deferring
the expensive ones. More specifically, given a data update, the index maintenance needs
to perform two sub-tasks, that is, 1) to insert new data versions to the store and 2) to find
and delete old versions. Sub-task 1) involves only Put operations, while sub-task 2), called
index repair, requires a Get operation to find the old version. The insight here is that
LSKV storeis write-optimized in the sense of fast Put and slow Get, which makes sub-
task 1) lightweight and the index-repair sub-task 2) heavyweight. HINDEX’s strategy to
schedule the index maintenance is to synchronously execute sub-task 1) while deferring
the expensive index-repair sub-task.
A core design choice regarding the deferred index repair is when the execution should
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be deferred to. Our key observation is that a Get operation is much faster when it is ex-
ecuted after a compaction than before that. Here, a compaction is a native maintenance
routine in LSKV store; it cleans up obsolete data and reorganizes the on-disk data lay-
out. To verify the observation, we conducted a performance study on HBase 0.94.2. A
preview of the experiment results is shown in Figure 8; the Get can achieve more than
7× speedup in latency when executed after a compaction comparing to that before a com-
paction.1 Based on this observation, we propose a novel design that defers the index repair
to the offline compaction process. By coupling the index repair with the compaction it can
save the index-repair overhead substantially.





















Figure 8: Read latency before/after compaction
The contributions of this chapter are summarized below.
• We coin the term LSKV store that abstracts various industrial strength big-data stor-
age systems (including HBase, Cassandra, BigTable, HyperTable, etc). We propose
HINDEX to extend the LSKV store’s existing API by including a value-based access
method.
1For details, please refer to the experiments in Section 3.6.2 and the explanation in Section 3.2.2.
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• We make the index maintenance lightweight in HINDEX for write-intensive work-
loads. The core idea is performance awareness; it defers expensive operations while
executing inexpensive ones synchronously in an LSKV storesystem. We also opti-
mize the performance of deferred index maintenance by scheduling it with the com-
paction process.
• We analyze the fault-tolerance of HINDEX in terms of both online operations and
offline index-repair process. The fault tolerance in HINDEX is achieved without
sacrificing performance efficiency.
• HINDEX is designed to be generic on any LSKV store. While a generic implemen-
tation of HINDEX is realized in both HBase and Cassandra, we also demonstrate
an HBase-specific implementation that optimizes performance without any internal
code change in HBase (by using exposed system hooks).
3.2 Background: LSKV store
LSKV store, represented by BigTable [53]/HBase [14] and Cassandra [9], has the follow-
ing two common and distinctive features.2 Note that specific LSKV storesystems may
differ in other aspects (e.g. HBase shards data by range partitioning while Cassandra is
based on consistent hashing).
3.2.1 Key-Value Data Model
LSKV store employs a key-value data model with a Put/Get API. In the data model, a data
object is identified by a unique key k and consists of a series of attributes in the format
of key-value pairs; a value v is associated with multiple overwriting versions, each with
a unique timestamp ts. To update and retrieve an object, LSKV store exposes a simple
Put/Get API: Put(k, v, ts), Delete(k, ts) and Get(k) → {〈k, v, ts〉}. When calling these
2Note that other than LSKV store, there are key-value stores that are read optimized, such as PNUT [55].
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API functions, the presence of a key k is required, which makes them key-based access
methods.
3.2.2 LSM Tree-based Data Persistence
LSKV store adopts the design of LSM tree [99, 106] for its local data persistence. The
core idea is to apply random data updates in append-only fashion, so that most random
disk access can be translated to efficient, sequential disk writes. The read and write paths
of an LSM tree are shown in Figure 9. After the LSM tree locally receives a Put request,
the data is first buffered3 in an in-memory area called Memstore4, and at a later time is
flushed to disk. This Flush process sorts all data in Memstore based on key, builds a key-
based cluster index (called block index) in batch, and then persists both the sorted data and
index to disk. Each Flush process generates an immutable file on disk, called HFile. As
time goes by, multiple Flush executions can accumulate multiple HFiles on disk. On the
data read path, an LSM tree process a Get request by sifting through existing HFiles on
disk to retrieve multiple versions of the requested object. Even in the presence of existing
in-memory index schemes (e.g., Bloom filters and the block index used in HBase), an
LSM tree still has to access multiple files for a Get, because the append-only writes put
multiple versions of the same object to different HFiles in a non-deterministic way. This
design renders LSKV store to be a write-optimized system since a data write causes mostly
in-memory operations, while a read has to randomly access the disk, causing disk seeks.
An LSKV store exposes a Compaction interface for system administrator to perform
the periodical maintenance routine, usually in offline hours. A Compaction call triggers
the compaction process, which merges multiple on-disk HFiles to one and performs data
cleaning jobs to reclaim disk space from obsolete object versions. The Compaction con-
solidate the resource utilization in the LSKV store for further operation efficiency.
3For durability, LSM trees often have option for write-ahead logging (or WAL) before each write to buffer.


















Figure 9: System architecture of an LSM tree: Black/red arrows denote the read/write path.
Thick arrows represent disk access.
Fault tolerance An LSKV storeis fault-tolerant as long as it is on top of a reliable file
system (e.g. HDFS). We can analyze the fault tolerance along the data write path in Fig-
ure 9: 1) For data in Memstore, it is fault tolerant because it is first persisted in the WAL;
2) Data in HFile is fault tolerant provided that HFile is stored reliably by HDFS. Upon ma-
chine failure, an LSKV storetypically does the following to recover: It relies on a global
coordination service (e.g. Zookeeper) to detect the failure using a heart-beat mechanism,
then retrieves the WAL data from the failed machine and re-assigns it to other live ma-
chines, which proceeds to replay the WAL data and restore the Memstore before it can be
linked with previously persisted HFiles and serve the upcoming read and write requests.
3.2.3 Extension Interfaces in LSKV store
Following the trend of moving computation close to data, there is a recent body of work
that enriches server-side functionality by adding extension interfaces to the key-value stores
including HBase’s CoProcessor [15], Cassandra’s Plugins/Triggers [16, 17], Percolators’
trigger functionality [101]. These extension interfaces typically expose event-based pro-
gramming hooks and allow client applications to easily inject code (e.g., stored procedure)
into store servers and associate that with their internal events. With the interfaces, one can
extend the functionality of a key-value server without changing its internal code.
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3.3 The HINDEX Structure
In this section we first present the system and data model in HINDEX, and then describe















Figure 10: HINDEX architecture
3.3.1 System and Data Model
In a cloud environment, a server system is organized into a multi-tier architecture, consist-
ing of application and storage tiers. The application tier processes queries and prepares the
data formatting for the writes, while the storage tier is responsible for persisting the data.
We consider the use of LSKV store in the storage tier, as shown in Figure 10. In this archi-
tecture, HINDEX is a middleware that resides between the application and storage tiers. To
the application servers, it exposes both key-based and value-based API, as described be-
low. The application servers are referred to as “client” (of HINDEX) in this chapter. To the
underlying LSKV store, HINDEX translates the API invocations to the Put/Get operations.
• Write(k, v, ts): Given a row key k, it updates (or inserts) the value to be v with
timestamp ts.
• ReadKey(k, ts,m) → {〈k, v′, ts′〉}m: Given a row key k, it returns the value ver-
sions before ts, that is, ts′ ≤ ts. HINDEX considers an m-versioning policy, which
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allows client applications to indicate the number of versions deemed as fresh (by m).
The method would return the latest m versions of the requested key.
• ReadValue(v, ts,m) → {〈k′, v, ts′〉}: Given an indexed value v, it retrieves all the
row keys k′ whose values are v and which are valid under the m-versioning policy.
That is, the result version ts′ must be among the latest m versions of its key k′ as of
time ts.
The first two methods are similar to the existing key-based Put/Get interface (with dif-
ferent internal implementations), while the last one is for value-based data access. In the
API design, we expose timestamp ts for the client applications to specify the consistency
requirement. In practice, generating a unique timestamp, if necessary, can be done by
existing timestamp oracles [128, 101].
HINDEX, being a generic index structure, can be adapted to various index and query
types for different application purposes. While the rest of the chapter will primarily use
the exact-match query to represent value-based accesses, it is straightforward to extend it
to other query types. For example, the full-text search can be supported by having each
row storing a document and having value v to be a keyword. In this case, ReadValue(v)
returns a document that contains keyword v.
3.3.2 Index Materialization
The index data is materialized in a regular data table inside the underlying LSKV store. The
index table is not directly managed by the client applications; instead, it is fully managed
by our HINDEX middleware. In terms of structure, the index table is an inverted version of
the base table; when the base table stores a (valid) key-value pair, say 〈k, v〉, the index table
would store the reversed pair as 〈v, k〉. For different keys associated with the same value in
the base table, HINDEX materializes them in the same row in the index table but as different
versions. The versioning mechanism is disabled in the index table, and all obsolete index
version is required to be deleted explicitly.
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In the case of skewed data distribution, it could occur that certain index rows for com-
mon values are huge. It may result in a long list of query results by a ReadValue call.
In this situation, we rely on a pagination mechanism to limit the number of key-value
pairs in a ReadValue query result. Specifically, we allows an optional parameter p as in
ReadValue(v, ts,m, [p]) which limits the number of ReadValue results to be under p.
Currently, we assume it is the applications’ responsibility to specify the value of p in the
case of skewed data distribution, although automatically setting value p could be the future
work.
3.4 Online HINDEX
This section describes the design of online HINDEX in terms of index maintenance, query
evaluation, analysis of fault tolerance, and the implementation.
3.4.1 Put-Only Index Maintenance
Given a data update as a key-value pair 〈k, v〉, the index maintenance needs to include four
tasks to keep both the index and base table up-to-date: 1) Deleting old versions associated
with key k in the index table. This causes a Delete(v′, k, ts′) call, in which v′ is the old
version obsoleted by new version 〈k, v〉. Since old version v′ is unknown from the original
data update 〈k, v〉, it entails a Get operation to read the old version; 2) Reading the old
version from the base table. This causes a call for Get(k)→ 〈k, v′〉; 3) Inserting new
version to the base table, which causes Put(k, v, ts); 4) Inserting new version to the index,
which causes Put(v, k, ts).
A straightforward way to execute the index maintenance process is to synchronously
execute all the four operations, which is essentially what the traditional update-in-place
indexing technique does (which is also widely used in many cloud databases [41, 65]).
However, this strategy causes performance problems when applied to the LSKV store case:
Recall that a Get operation in LSKV store is slow, and by attaching expensive Get to the
data write path, it could increase the write overhead and slow down the system throughput,
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especially when the workload is dominated by data writes. To improve the online index
maintenance efficiency, HINDEX employs a simple strategy to execute the Put-only 5 oper-
ations (i.e. operations 3) and 4)) synchronously and defer the execution of expensive index
repair operations (i.e. operations 1) and 2)) to later time. Algorithm 3 illustrates the on-
line Write algorithm. The two Put calls are annotated with the same timestamp ts. Here,
we deliberately put the index update ahead of the base table update for the fault-tolerance
concerns which will be discussed.
Table 4: Algorithms for online writes and reads
Algorithm 3 Write(key k, value v, timestamp ts)
1: index.Put(v, k, ts)
2: base.Put(k, v, ts)
Algorithm 4 ReadValue(value v, timestamp ts, versioning m)
1: {〈k, ts′〉} ← index.Get(v, ts) ⊲ ts′ ≤ ts
2: for ∀〈k, ts′〉 ∈ {〈k, ts′〉} do
3: {〈k, v′, ts′′〉} ← ReadKey(k, ts, m) ⊲ ts′′ is earlier than ts
4: if ts′ ∈ {〈k, v′, ts′′〉} then ⊲ ts′ is a fresh version regarding ts
5: result list.add({〈k, v, ts′〉})
6: else
7: if ts′ > min {〈k, v′, ts′′〉} then




12: return result list
3.4.2 Read-Query Evaluation
The Put-only index maintenance may lead to obsolete index data (e.g. 〈v′, k〉 is present in
the index table after 〈k, v〉 is written). This requires a ReadValue query to always check
whether an index entry is fresh. Given an index data 〈v′, k〉, the freshness check is done by
checking with the base table, from which multiple value versions of key k are co-located
at the same place and version freshness can be easily known. Algorithm 4 illustrates the
5Since Put is an append-only operation in LSKV store, we may use the term “Put-only” and “append-
only” interchangeably in this chapter.
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evaluation algorithm for ReadValue(v, ts,m): It first issues a Get call to the index table
and reads the related index entries before timestamp ts. For each returned index entry,
say ts′, it needs to determine whether the entry is fresh under the m-versioning policy. To
do so, the algorithm reads the base table by issuing a ReadKey query (which is a simple
wrapper of a Get call to the base table), which returns all the latest m versions {ts′′} before
timestamp ts. Depending on whether ts′ show up in the list of {ts′′}, the algorithm can then
decide that it is fresh or obsolete. Only when the version is fresh, it is then added to the
final result. If it is found that the index version ts′ is not present in the base table, implying
the occurrence of a failure, it issues a Delete call to remove the dangling index data.
3.4.3 Fault Tolerance
In a cloud environment where machines fail, it is possible that a Write can fail with only
one Put completed. To deal with failure, our API has the following semantics.
• A Write is considered to succeed only when both Put operations complete, and a
read (either ReadKey or ReadValue) will not return any data that is not written
successfully.
Under this semantics, HINDEX can achieve consistent data reads and writes with effi-
ciency. We consider the scenario where the machine issuing a Write call fails. It is a trivial
case when the failure occurs either before or after the Write invocation; in this case, nothing
inconsistent will be left in the LSKV storeand this can be guaranteed by the fault-tolerance
and atomicity property of the underlying LSM tree (see Section 3.2.2). Thus, what is in-
teresting is the case that failure happens between index.Put(v, k, t) and base.Put(k, v, t)
in the write path. This case can lead to dangling index rows without corresponding data
stored in the base table. This (inconsistent) situation can affect the reads under three cir-
cumstances: 1) ReadValue(v), 2) ReadValue(v′) where v′ is the version right before v
and 3) ReadKey(k). For case 1), Algorithm 4 is able to discover the dangling index data
(as in Line 7) and would correctly neglect such data to comply with our API semantics. It
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actually issues an index.Delete(〈v, k〉) to remove the dangling data from being considered
by future ReadValue(v) invocations. For case 2), Algorithm 4 will not find any version
that overwrites v′ in the base table and would return 〈k, v′〉. For case 3), ReadKey returns
〈k, v′〉. In all cases, our API semantics holds. It is fairly easy to extend this analysis to
multiple failed Write’s.
3.4.4 Implementation of Online HINDEX
Online HINDEX can be implemented on LSKV stores by two approaches. The first ap-
proach is to implement it in the client library. That is, the client directly coordinates all the
function calls (e.g. Write and ReadKey) as in the Write and ReadValue algorithms; This
is possible since all the operations in these algorithms are based on the generic Put/Get
interface. The second approach is server-side implementation. In this case, the index and
base table servers play the role of coordinators to execute the read and write algorithms. In
particular, the Write is rewritten to a base-table Put by the HINDEX client library. When
the base-table Put gets executed in the base table, it also triggers the execution of the
index-table Put. Likewise, the ReadValue is rewritten to an index-table Get call, upon
the completion of which the index table triggers the execution of the base-table Get, if
needed. The server-side implementation favors the case where application servers and
storage servers are located in different clusters and the cross-boundary inter-cluster com-
munications are more expensive than the intra-cluster communications. The server-side
implementation can be done by directly modifying the code of an LSKV store system,
or as in our implemented prototype, by adding server extensions based on the extension
interface of LSKV stores.
3.5 Offline HINDEX: Batched Index Repair
In HINDEX, the index repair process eliminates the obsolete index entries and can keep
the index fresh and up-to-date. This section describes the design and implementation of an
offline and batched repair mechanism in HINDEX.
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3.5.1 Computation Model and Algorithm
To repair the index table, it is essential to find the obsolete data versions. A data version,
say 〈v′, k, ts′〉, is considered to be obsolete when either of the following two conditions is
met.
1. There are at least m newer key-value versions of key k that exist in the system.
2. There is at least one newer Delete tombstone6 of key k that exists in the system.
The process to find the obsolete versions, called index garbage collection, is realized
by scanning the base table. Because the base table has the data sorted in the key order,
which helps verify the above two conditions. Algorithm 5 illustrates the batched garbage
collection algorithm on a data stream that is output from the table scan; the data stream is
assumed to have key-value pairs ordered first by key and then by timestamp. The algorithm
maintains a queue of size m and emits the version only when it is older than at least m
versions of the same key k in the queue and it is repaired by previous repair processes (will
be discussed in next paragraph). In the algorithm, it also considers the condition regarding
a Delete tombstone; it will emit all the versions before the Delete tombstone marker. Note
that our algorithm requires a small memory footprint (i.e. the queue of size m).
Our offline index repair process runs periodically (e.g. on a daily or weekly basis). To
avoid duplicated work between multiple rounds of repairs, we require that each run of an
index repair process is marked with a timestamp, so that the versions of interest to this run
are those with timestamps falling in between the timestamp of this run and that of previous
run (i.e. tsLast). Any version that is older than tsLast was repaired before by previous index-
repair processes and is not considered in the current run.
6In an LSKV store, a Delete operation appends a tombstone marker in the store without physically delet-
ing the data.
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Algorithm 5 BatchedGC(Table-scan stream s, versioning m, tsLast)
1: for ∀〈k, v, ts〉 ∈ s do ⊲ Stream data sorted by key and time (in descending order)
2: if kCurrent == k then
3: if queue.size() < m then
4: queue.enqueueToHead(〈k, v, ts〉)
5: else if queue.size == m then
6: queue.enqueueToHead(〈k, v, ts〉)
7: 〈k, v′, ts′〉 ← queue.dequeueFromTail() ⊲ All pairs in the queue are of the same
key kCurrent = k
8: if ts′ ≥ tsLast then ⊲ ts′ is no older than tsLast




13: loop queue.size()> 0 ⊲ Clear the queue
14: 〈k, v′, ts′〉 ← queue.dequeueFromHead()




19: kCurrent ← k




3.5.2 Compaction-Aware System Design
To materialize the table scan in the presence of an offline compaction process, one can
generally have three design options, that is, to run the index repair 1) before the compaction,
2) after the compaction or 3) coupled inside the compaction. In HINDEX, we adopt the last
two options (i.e. to couple the index repair either after or within the compaction). Recall
that in an LSKV store, the read performance is significantly improved after the compaction.
The rationale of such design choice is that the table scan, being essentially a batch of reads,
has its performance dependent on the compaction: Without the compaction, there would
be a number of on-disk files and a key-ordered scan would essentially become a batch of
random reads that make the disk heads swing between the multiple on-disk files.
Overall, the offline HINDEX runs in three stages; as illustrated in Figure 11, it runs the
offline compaction, garbage collection and index garbage deletion. After a Compaction
call is issued, the system runs the compaction routine, which then triggers the execution
of index garbage collection and deletion (for the index repair). Specifically, the garbage
collection emit the obsolete data versions to the next-stage garbage deletion process. The
index garbage deletion issues a batch of deletion requests to the distributed index table. In
the following, we describe our subsystems for each stage and discuss the design options.
3.5.2.1 The Garbage Collection
We present two system designs for garbage collection, including an isolated design that
puts the garbage collection right after the compaction process, and a pipelined design that
couples the garbage collection inside the compaction process.
An isolated design The garbage collection subsystem is materialized as an isolated com-
ponent that runs after the previous compaction completes. As portrayed in Figure 11, the
system monitors the number of sorted data files in the local machine. When an offline




















Figure 11: Compaction-aware index repair
monitor component triggers the garbage collection process. In this case, the garbage col-
lection reloads the newly generated file to memory (and the file system cache may still be
hot), scan it, and run Algorithm 5 to collect the obsolete data versions.
A pipelined design Alternatively, the garbage collection subsystem can be implemented
by pipelining the compaction’s output stream directly to the garbage collection service. To
be specific, as shown in Figure 11, the pipelined garbage collection intercepts the output
stream from the compaction while the data is still in memory; the realization of interception
will be described below. Then it runs the garbage collection computation in Algorithm 5;
if the data versions are found to be obsolete, they are emitted but still being persisted (for
fault-tolerance concerns). Comparing the isolated design, the pipelined design saves disk
accesses, since the data stream is directly pipelined in memory without being reloaded from
disk.
In terms of generosity, while the isolated design can be implemented on any key-value
60
stores as it requires nothing more than a generic file abstraction, the pipelined implementa-
tion may benefit from certain system hooks (e.g. the ones exposed by HBase). We imple-
mented the isolated system on both HBase and Cassandra, and implemented the pipelined
system on HBase.
Implementation of Pipelined Repair The compaction’s output stream can be inter-
cepted by various approaches. The most straightforward and generalized approach is to
directly modify the internal code of an LSKV store. Another approach is to rely on the
extension interface widely available in existing LSKV stores (described in Section 3.2.3)
which allows for an add-on and easier implementation. In particular, our HBase-based pro-
totype implements the pipelined design using extension-based implementation; We register
a CoProcessor callback function to hook the garbage collection code inside the compaction.
By this way, our implementation requires no internal code change of HBase, and can even
be deployed lively onto a running HBase cluster.
3.5.2.2 The Index Garbage Deletion
For each key-value pair emitted from the garbage collection, it enters the garbage deletion
stage; the data is first buffered in memory and later shuffled before being sent out by a
Delete call to the remote index table. The shuffle process sorts and clusters the data pairs
based on the value. By this way, the reversed value-key pairs with the same destination can
be packed into a single serializable object in a RPC call, thus network utilization can be
improved. In the design of the garbage deletion subsystem, we expose a tunable knob to
configure the maximal buffer size; The bigger the buffer is, the more bandwidth efficiency
it can achieve at the expense of more memory overhead.
3.5.3 Fault Tolerance
To design our index-repair protocol with fault tolerance, we enforce the following property:
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• Given a compaction and index-repair process with tsLast, it does not physically delete
any data of interest (i.e. with timestamp between now and tsLast).
Note that for any data before tsLast, physical deletion is enabled.
Based on this property and idempotency of underlying LSKV store (i.e. there is no
additional effect if a Put is called more than once with the same parameters), we can easily
guarantee the fault tolerance of the index-repair process. The logic is following: Given a
failed run of index repair, we can simply ignore its partial results and keep the old tsLast.
Upon the next run of index repair, the above property guarantees that all data versions from
tsLast to the present are still there in the system and the current run, if it succeeds, will
eventually repair the index table correctly. Note that since the previously repaired data
is not deleted, it may cause some duplicated operations which however do not affect the
correctness due to idempotency.
3.6 Experiments
This section describes our experimental evaluation of HINDEX. We first did experiments to
study the performance characteristics of HBase, a representative LSKV store, and then to
study HINDEX’s performance under various micro-benchmarks and a synthetic benchmark.






















Figure 12: Experiment platform and HINDEX deployment
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3.6.1 Experiment System Setup
The experiment system, as illustrated in Figure 12, is organized in a client/server architec-
ture. In the experiment, we use one client node and a 19-node server cluster, consisting
of a master and 18 slaves. The client connects to both the master and the slaves. We set
up the experiment system by using Emulab [18, 126]; all the experiment nodes in Emulab
are homogeneous in the sense that each machine is equipped with the same 2.4 GHz 64-bit
Quad Core Xeon processor and a 12 GB RAM. In terms of the software stack, the server
cluster uses both Hadoop HBase and HDFS [13]. The HBase and HDFS clusters are co-
hosted on the same set of nodes, as shown in Figure 12. Unless otherwise specified, we use
the default configuration in the out-of-box HBase. The client side is based on the YCSB
framework [56], an industry-standard benchmark tool for evaluating the key-value store
performance. The original YCSB framework generates only key-based queries, and for
testing our new API, we extended the YCSB to generate value-based queries. We use the
modified YCSB framework to drive workload into the server cluster and measure the query
performance. In addition, we collect the system profiling metrics (e.g. number of disk
reads) through a JMX (Java management extension) client. For each run of experiments,
we clean the local file system cache.
HINDEX prototype deployment We have implemented an HINDEX prototype in Java
and on top of HBase 0.94.2. The HINDEX prototype is deployed to our experiment platform
in two components; as shown by dark rectangular in Figure 12, the HINDEX middleware
has a client-side library for the online operations and a server-side component for the offline
index repair. In particular, based on system hooks in HBase, the prototype implements both
the isolated garbage collection and pipelined garbage collection in the server component.
Dataset Our raw dataset consists of 1000, 000, 000 key-value pairs, generated by YCSB
using its default parameters that simulates the production use of key-value stores inside
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Yahoo!. In this dataset, data keys are generated in a Zipf distribution and are potentially
duplicated, resulting in 20, 635, 449 distinct keys. The data values are indexed. The raw
dataset is pre-materialized to a set of data files, which are then loaded to the system for
each experiment run. For query evaluation, we use 1, 000, 000 key-value queries, be it
either Write, ReadValue or ReadKey. The query keys are randomly chosen from the
same raw dataset, either from the data keys or values.
3.6.2 Performance Study of HBase
Read-write performance This set of experiments evaluates the read-write performance
in the out-of-box HBase to verify that HBase is aptly used in a write-intensive workload. In
the experiment, we set the target throughput high enough to saturate the system. We config-
ure the JVM (on which HBase runs) with different heap sizes. We varied the read-to-write
ratio 7 in the workload, and report the maximal sustained throughput in Figure 13a, as well
as the latency in Figures 13b. In Figure 13a, as the workload becomes more read intensive,
the maximal sustained throughput of HBase decreases, exponentially. For different JVM
memory sizes, HBase exhibits the similar behavior. This result shows that HBase is not
omnipotent but particularly optimized for write-intensive workloads. Figure 13b depicts
the latency respectively for reads and writes (i.e. Get and Put) in HBase. It can be seen
that the reads are much slower than writes, by an order of magnitudes. This result matches
the system model of LSKV store in which reads need to check more than one places on
disk and the writes are append-only and fast. In the figure, as the workload becomes more
read intensive, the read latency decreases. Because with read-intensive workload, there are
fewer writes and thus fewer data versions in the system for a read to check, resulting in
faster reads.
7In the chapter, the read-to-write ratio refers to the percentage of reads in a read-write workload.
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(a) Maximal sustained throughput
















Figure 13: HBase performance under different read ratios
Read Performance and HFiles This experiment evaluates HBase’s read performance
under varying number of HFiles. In the experiment, we start with preloading the dataset
into the HBase cluster, which results in averagely 11 HFiles in each region sever as shown
in Figure 8. During the experiment, we issued every 5 million Put’s to the HBase cluster
and measure the read latency by issuing a number of Get’s then. In this process, we have
configured the HBase to disable its automatic compaction and region split and during the
read performance evaluation, we disallow any Put operations, so that the number of HFiles
would stay constant at that time. We measure the number of HFiles between each Put
stage. As shown in Figure 8, the average number of HFiles increases from 11 to 27.5 in
the experiment. In the end, we manually issued an offline Compaction call across all the
regions in the cluster, which should leave all the regions with a single HFile. Then the
read latency is measured again. We report the changes of read latency in this process in
Figure 14 with the red line. As can be seen, the line of read latency basically matches with
that of number of HFiles; As there are more HFiles present in HBase, the read latency also
becomes bigger. After the compaction which merge all HFiles into one, the read latency
also drops greatly. The experiment shows the strong dependency between the Get latency
and the number of HFiles in HBase. In particular, for the state with 27.5 HFiles and the
final state with 1 HFiles, we have shown the latency difference previously in Figure 8.
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Figure 14: Read latency with varying number of HFiles
3.6.3 HINDEX Performance
Online write performance This experiment evaluates HINDEX performance under the
write-only workloads. We drive the data writes from the client into the HBase server clus-
ter. We compare HINDEX with the update-in-place indexing approach described in Sec-
tion 3.4.1. We also consider the ideal case where there is no index structure to maintain.
The results of sustained throughput are reported in Figure 15. As the target throughput
increases, the update-in-place indexing approach hits the saturation point much earlier than
HINDEX. While HINDEX can achieve a maximal throughput at about 14 thousand opera-
tions (kops) per second, the update-in-place indexing approach can only sustain at most 4
kops per second. Note that the ideal case without indexing can achieve higher throughput
but can not serve the value-based queries. This result leads to a 3 × performance speedup
of HINDEX. In terms of the latency, Figure 15b illustrates that HINDEX constantly outper-
forms the update-in-place approach under varied throughput.
Online read-write performance In this experiment, we evaluate HINDEX’s performance
in the workload that varies from read-intensive workloads to write-intensive ones. We
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Figure 15: Index write performance
compare HINDEX on top of HBase against two alternative architectures: the B-tree index
in MySQL and the update-in-place indexing on HBase. For fair comparison, we use the
same dataset in both HBase and MySQL, and drive the same workload there. MySQL is
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accessible to YCSB through a JDBC driver implemented by us, in which we reduce as
much as possible the overhead spent in the JDBC layer. The results are shown in Fig-
ure 16. With varying read-to-write ratios, HINDEX on HBase is clearly optimized toward
write-intensive workload, as can be seen in Figure 16a. On a typical write-intensive setting
with 0.1 read-to-write ratio, HINDEX on HBase outperforms the update-in-place index on
HBase by a 2.5× or more speedup, and the BTree index in MySQL by 10×. When the
workload becomes more read-intensive, HINDEX may become less advantageous. By con-
trast, the update-in-place approach is more read-optimized and the BTree index in MySQL
is inefficient, regardless of workloads. This may be due to that MySQL uses locking inten-
sively for full transaction support, an overkill to our targeted use case. In terms of latency,
the HINDEX on HBase has the lowest write latency at the expenses of relatively high read
latency due to the extra reads to the base table. By contrast, the update-in-place index has
the highest write latency (due to the reads of obsolete versions in the base table) and a
low read latency (due to that it only needs to read the index table). Note that in our ex-
periments, we use more write-intensive values for read-to-write ratios (e.g. more ticks in
interval [0, 0.5) than in [0.5, 1.0]).
Offline index repair performance This experiment evaluates the performance of offline
index repair with compaction. We mainly focus on the approach of compaction-triggered
repair in the offline HINDEX; in the experiment we tested two implementations, with iso-
lated garbage collection and pipelined garbage collection. For comparison, we consider
a baseline approach that runs the batch index repair before (rather than after) the com-
paction (i.e. design option 1) in Section 3.5.2). We also test the ideal case in which an
offline compaction runs without any repair operations. During the experiment, we tested
two datasets: a single-versioned dataset that is populated with only data insertions so that
each key-value pair has one version, and a multi-versioned dataset populated by both data
insertions and updates which results in averagely 3 versions for each data value. While
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the multi-versioned data is used to evaluate both garbage collection and deletion during the
index repair, the single-versioned dataset is mainly used to evaluate the garbage collection,
since there are no obsoleted versions to delete. In the experiment, we have configured the
buffer size to be big enough to accommodate all obsolete data in memory. 8 We issued an
offline Compaction call in each experiment, which automatically triggers the batch index
repair process. Till the end, we collect the system profiling information. In particular, we
collect two metrics, the execution time and the total number of disk block reads. Both
metrics are emitted by the HBase’s native profiling subsystem, and we implemented a JMX
client to capture those values.
We run the experiment three times, and report the average results in Figure 17. The
execution time is reported in Figure 17a. In general the execution time with multi-versioned
dataset is much longer than that with the single-versioned dataset, because of the extra need
for the index deletion. Among the four approaches, the baseline is the most costly because
it loads the data twice and from the not-yet-merged small data files, implying that disk reads
are mostly random accesses. The ideal case incurs the shortest time, as expected. Between
the two HINDEX designs, the pipelined garbage collection requires shorter time because
it only needs to load the on-disk data once. To understand the performance difference, it
is interesting to look at the disk read numbers, as shown in Figure 17b. We only show
the results with the single-versioned dataset, because disk reads only occur in the garbage
collection. The baseline approach incurs a similar number of disk reads to the isolated
design, because both approaches load the data twice from the disk. Note that the disk
reads in the baseline approach are most random access while at least half of disk access
in the isolated HINDEX should be sequential; this leads to differences in their execution
time. In Figure 17b, the ideal case has a similar cost to the pipelined design, because
both approaches load on-disk data once. From the single-versioned results in Figure 17a,
8We try to set up our experiment to be more bounded by local disk accesses than by the network com-
munications, so that the offline index repair process is dominated by the garbage collection process than the
deletion process.
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it can be seen that their execution time is also very close to each other, due to that the
extra garbage collection caused by the HINDEX approach is very lightweight and incurs
few in-memory computations.
Table 5: Overhead under Put and Compaction operations
Name Exec. time (sec) Number of disk reads
HINDEX 1553.158 60699
Update-in-place index 4619.456 313662
Name Online Offline Online Offline
HINDEX 1093.832 459.326 0 60699
Update-in-place index 4340.277 279.179 252964 60698
Mixed online and offline operations In this experiment, we compare HINDEX and the
update-in-place indexing approach as a whole package. In other words, we consider the on-
line and offline operations together. Because the update-in-place approach already repairs
the index in the online phase, there is no need to perform index repair in the offline time.
For fair comparison, we run the offline compaction (without any repair actions) for the
update-in-place index. In the experiment, the online workload contains a series of writes
and the offline workload simply issues a Compaction call and if any, the batch index re-
pair. For simplicity, we here only report the results of pipelined HINDEX. We report the
execution time and the number of disk reads. The results are presented in Table 5. In
general, HINDEX incurs much shorter execution time and fewer disk reads than the update-
in-place approach. For example, the execution time of HINDEX (in bold text in the table) is
one third of that of the update-in-place approach. We breaks down the results to the online
costs and offline costs, as in the bottom half of the table, which clearly shows the advantage
of having the index repair deferred to the offline phase in HINDEX. Although the update-
in-place index wins slightly in terms of the offline compaction (see the bold text “279.179”
compared to “459.326” in the table), HINDEX wins big in the online computation phase
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(see bold text “1093.832” compared to “4340.277” in the table). It leads to overall perfor-
mance gain of HINDEX. In terms of disk reads, it is noteworthy that HINDEX incurs zero
costs in the online phase.
3.7 Related Work
Secondary indexes in key-value stores Recently, a large body of academic work [41,
34, 65] and industrial projects [73, 28, 19, 43, 12, 108, 20] emerge to build secondary
indexes as middleware on scalable key-value store systems. Those systems can be largely
categorized by their design choices in terms of: 1) whether the index is local or global, 2)
how the index is maintained, and 3) the system implementation. Regarding choice 2), the
index can be maintained synchronously, asynchronously, or in a hybrid way. Synchronous
index maintenance indicates real-time query result availability at the expense of extra index
update overhead. Asynchronous index maintenance means the whole index updates are
deferred. The hybrid approach is essential the append-only design (as in HINDEX) in which
only the expensive part of index maintenance is deferred. In terms of implementation, the
index middleware can be in the client or server side, depending on the preference on system
generosity or performance. We summarize these key-value store indexes in Table 6.
In particular, Megastore [43] is Google’s effort to support the cloud-scale database on
the BigTable storage [53]. Megastore supports secondary indexes at two levels, namely the
local index and global index. The local index considers the data from an “entity group”
of machines that are close by. When the entity group is small, the local index is main-
tained synchronously at low overhead. The global index which spans cross multiple groups
is maintained asynchronously in a lazy manner. F1 [108], built on top of Spanner [57],
supports global indexing in fully consistent and transactional fashion; it applies 2PC with
reasonably low costs. PIQL [41] supports a scale-independent subset of SQL queries in-
cluding the value-based selection queries. The index maintenance in PIQL is based on
the update-in-place approach. In addition, to support analytical queries, prior work [34]
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Table 6: Key-value indexing systems ( – means uncertain and * means HINDEX is imple-
mented on HBase and Cassandra.)
References Local/Global Index Mntn Impl.
Phoenix [28] Global Hybrid HBase-Server
Huawei’s Index [19] Local Sync HBase-Server
Cassandra Index [12] Local – Cassandra-Server
HyperTable Idx [20] Global – HyperTable-Server
Megastore [43] Local/global Sync/Async BigTable-Client
F1 [108] Global Sync Spanner[57]-Client
PIQL [41] Global Sync SCADR [42]-Client
HINDEX Global Hybrid General*-Client/Server
maintains a global materialized view asynchronously and a local materialized view syn-
chronously on top of PNUTS [55]. The local view is mainly for processing aggregation
and ad-hoc queries, while the global view helps evaluate the selection queries. Hyper-
Dex [65] builds a key-value store from scratch to support a native ReadValue operation in
the presence of multi-dimensional data.
While existing literature considers the append-only index maintenance (e.g.
Phoenix [28]), it does not address the problem of scheduling expensive index-repair opera-
tions, which may lead to an eventually inconsistent index and cause unnecessary cross-table
check for query processing. By contrast, the HINDEX design is aware of the asymmetric
performance characteristic in an LSKV store and optimizes the execution of index repairs
accordingly.
Log-structured systems Log-structured systems have been studied for more than two
decades in the system community. The existing work largely falls under two categories,
the unsorted LFS-like systems [105] and sorted LSM tree-like systems. While the former
maintains a global log file in which data is appended purely by the write time, the latter
organizes the data layout to a number of spill files, in each of which data is sorted based
on the key. Log-structured systems generally rely on a garbage collection mechanism to
reclaim disk space and/or re-organize the data layout. In particular, several heuristic-based
garbage collection policies [49, 107] are proposed and adopted in LFS systems.
Recently, due to the burst of write-intensive workloads, log-structured design has been
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explored in the context of big data systems in the cloud. In addition to various LSKV store
systems, bLSM [106] aims at improving the read performance on log-structured stores;
the idea is to decompose the cumbersome compaction process so that it can be run at
fine granularity with costs being piggybacked with other concurrently running operations.
Several key-value stores adopt the unsorted LFS design. Based on a farm of Flash/SSD
storage nodes, FAWN [36] avoids the costly in-place writes on SSD by a sequential log and
maintains an in-memory index that is updated in place and can speed up the random reads.
RAMCloud [100] builds an in-memory data management system in Cloud with a focus of
efficient data recovery.
3.8 Conclusion
This chapter describes HINDEX, a lightweight real-time indexing framework for generic
log-structured key-value stores. The core design in HINDEX is to perform the append-only
online indexing and compaction-triggered offline indexing. By this way, the online index
update does not need to look into historic data for in-place updates, but rather appends a
new version, which substantially facilitates the execution. To fix the obsolete index entries,
HINDEX performs an offline batched index repair process. By coupling with the native
compaction routine in an LSKV store, the batch index repair achieves significant perfor-
mance improvement by incurring no extra disk accesses. We implemented an HINDEX
prototype based on HBase and demonstrate the performance gain by conducting experi-
ments in real-world system setup.
73










































































































































(b) Number of disk reads




OPTIMIZATION OF STREAMING APPLICATIONS ON
MULTI-CORE MACHINES
A system in the cloud typically deals with large number of machines, managing which man-
ually would be very labor-intensive work. Automating administrative tasks in the cloud,
particularly for performance optimization, would be critically important. In this chapter,
I describe my work on automatic pipelining for streaming applications on multi-core ma-
chines in the cloud.
4.1 Introduction
With the recent explosion in the amount of data available as live feeds, stream comput-
ing has found wide application in areas ranging from telecommunications to health-care
to cyber-security. Stream processing applications implement data-in-motion analytics to
ingest high-rate data sources, process them on-the-fly, and generate live results in a timely
manner. Stream computing middleware provides an execution substrate and runtime sys-
tem for stream processing applications. In recent years, many such systems have been
developed in academia [40, 33, 82], as well as in industry [111, 69, 129].
For the last decade, we have witnessed the proliferation of multi-core processors, fu-
eled by diminishing gains in processor performance from increasing operating frequencies.
Multi-core processors pose a major challenge to software development, as taking advantage
of them often requires fundamental changes to how application code is structured. Exam-
ples include employing thread-level primitives or relying on higher-level abstractions that
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have been the focus of much research and development [26, 2, 104, 52, 84, 54]. The high-
throughput processing requirement of stream processing applications makes them ideal for
taking advantage of multi-core processors. However, it is a challenge to keep the simple
and elegant data flow programming model of stream computing, while best utilizing the
multiple cores available in today’s processors.
Stream processing applications are represented as data flow graphs, consisting of
reusable operators connected to each other via stream connections attached to operator
ports. This is a programming model that is declarative at the flow manipulation level and
imperative at the flow composition level [71]. The data flow graph representation of stream
processing applications contains a rich set of parallelization opportunities. For instance,
pipeline parallelism is abundant in stream processing applications. While one operator is
processing a tuple, an upstream operator can process the next tuple concurrently. Many
data flow graphs contain bushy segments that process the same set of tuples, and which
can be executed in parallel. This is an example of task parallelism. It is noteworthy that
both forms of parallelism have advantages in terms of preserving the semantics of a parallel
program. On the other hand, exploiting data parallelism has additional complexity due to
the need for morphing the graph to create multiple copies of an operator and to re-establish
the order between tuples. Pipeline and task parallelism do not require morphing the graph
and preserve the order without additional effort. These two forms of parallelism can be
exploited by inserting the right number of threads into the data flow graph at the right lo-
cations. It is desirable to perform this kind of parallelization in a transparent manner, such
that the applications are developed without explicit knowledge of the amount of parallelism
available on the platform. We call this process auto-pipelining.
There are several challenges to performing effective and transparent auto-pipelining in
the context of stream processing applications.
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First, optimizing the parallelization of stream processing applications requires deter-
mining the relative costs of operators. The prevalence of user-defined operators in real-
world streaming applications [69] means that cost modeling, commonly applied in database
systems [66], is not applicable in this setting. On the other hand, profile-driven opti-
mization that requires one or more profile runs based on compiler-generated instrumen-
tation [70, 85], while effective, suffers from usability problems and lack of runtime adapta-
tion. On the usability side, requiring profile runs and specification of additional compilation
options has proven to be unpopular among users in our own experience. In terms of runtime
adaptation, the profile run may not be representative of the final execution. In summary,
a light-weight dynamic profiling of operators is needed in order to provide effective and
transparent auto-pipelining.
Second, and more fundamentally, it is a challenge to efficiently (time-wise) find an ef-
fective (throughput-wise) configuration that best utilizes available resources and harnesses
the inherent parallelism present in the streaming application. GivenN operator ports and up







to be precise. In the absence
of auto-pipelining, we have observed application developers struggling to insert threads
manually1 to improve throughput. This is no surprise, as for a medium size application
with 50 operators on an 8-core system, the number of possibilities reach multiple billions.
Thus, a practical optimization solution needs to quickly and automatically locate an effec-
tive configuration at runtime.
Finally, deciding the right level of parallelism is a challenge. The behavior of the sys-
tem is difficult to predict for various reasons. User-defined operators can contain locks that
inhibit effective parallelization. The overhead imposed by adding an additional thread in
the execution path is a function of the size of the tuples flowing through the port. The
behavior of the operating system scheduler can not be easily modeled and predicted. The
1SPL language [69] provides a configuration called ‘threaded port’ that can be used to manually insert
threads into a data flow graph.
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impact of these and other system artifacts are observable only at runtime and treated as a
blackbox. While the optimization step can come up with threading configuration changes
that are expected to improve performance, such decisions need to be tried out and dynami-
cally evaluated to verify their effectiveness. As such, we need a control algorithm that can
backtrack from bad decisions.
In this chapter we describe an auto-pipelining solution that addresses all of these chal-
lenges. It consists of:
• A light-weight run-time profiling scheme that uses a novel metric called per-port
utilization to determine the amount of time each thread spends downstream of a given
operator input port.
• A greedy optimization algorithm that finds locations in the data flow graph at which
inserting additional threads helps eliminate the system bottleneck and improve the
throughput.
• A control algorithm that decides when to stop inserting additional threads and also
backtracks from decisions that turn out to be ineffective.
• Runtime mechanics to insert/remove threads while maintaining lock correctness and
continuous operation.
We implemented our auto-pipelining solution on IBM’s System S [82] — an indus-
trial strength stream processing middleware. We evaluate its effectiveness using micro-
benchmarks, synthetic workloads, and real-world applications. Our results show that auto-
pipelining provides better throughput compared to hand-optimized applications at no cost
to application developers.
4.2 Background
We provide a brief overview of the basic concepts associated with stream processing appli-
cations, using SPL [69] as the language of illustration. We also describe the fundamentals
79
of runtime execution in System S.
4.2.1 Basic concepts
Listing 4.1 gives the source code for a very simple stream processing application in SPL,
with its visual representation depicted in Figure 18 below.
Listing 4.1: SensorQuery: A simple application in SPL.
composite SensorQuery {
type
Location = tuple<float32 x, float32 y>;
Sensor = tuple<uint64 sid, float64 value, Location sloc>;
Query = tuple<uint64 qid, Location qloc, float64 radius>;
Result = Sensor, Query, tuple<float32 distance>;
graph
stream<Sensor> Sensors = SensorSource() {}
stream<Query> Queries = QuerySource() {}
stream<Result> Results = Join(Sensors as S; Queries as Q) {
window Sensors: sliding, time(10.0);
Queries: sliding, count(0);
param match: distance(S.sloc, Q.qloc) <= Q.radius;
output Results: distance = distance(S.sloc, Q.qloc);
}







Figure 18: Data flow graph for the SensorQuery app.
The application is composed of operator instances connected to each other via stream
connections. An operator instance is a vertex in the application graph. An operator in-
stance is always associated with an operator. For instance, the operator instance shown in
the middle of the graph in Figure 18 is an instance of a Join operator. In general, opera-
tors can have many different instantiations, each using different stream types, parameters,
or other configurations such as windows. Operator instances can have zero or more input
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and output ports. Each output port generates a uniquely named stream, which is a sequence
of tuples. Connecting an output port to the input of an operator establishes a stream con-
nection. Operators are often implemented in general purpose languages, using an event
driven interface, by reacting to tuples arriving on operator input ports. Tuple processing
generally involves updating some operator-local state and producing result tuples that are
sent out on the output ports.
There are two important aspects of real-world applications that are highly relevant for
our work:
• Real-world applications are usually much larger in terms of the number of operators
they contain, reaching hundreds or even thousands.
• Real-world applications contain many user-defined re-usable operators to implement
cross-domain or domain-specific manipulations.
The former point motivates the need for automatic parallelization, whereas the latter
motivates the need for dynamic profiling.
4.2.2 Execution model
A distributed stream processing middleware, such as System S, executes data flow graphs
by partitioning them into basic units called processing elements. Each processing element
contains a sub-graph and can run on a different host. For small and medium-scale applica-
tions, the entire graph can map to a single processing element. Without loss of generality,
in this chapter we focus on a single multi-core host executing the entire graph. Our auto-
pipelining technique can be applied independently on each host when the whole application
consists of multiple, distributed processing elements.
There are two main sources of threading in our streaming runtime system, which con-
tribute to the execution of the data flow graphs. The first one is operator threads. Source
operators, which do not have any input ports, are driven by a separate thread. When a source
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operator makes a submit call to send a tuple to its output port, this same thread executes
the rest of the downstream operators in the data flow graph. As a result, the same thread
can traverse a number of operators, before eventually coming back to the source operator to
execute the next iteration of its event loop. This behavior is because the stream connections
in a processing element are implemented via function calls. Using function calls yields fast
execution, avoiding scheduler context switches and explicit buffers between operators. We
refer to this optimization as operator fusion [85, 70]. Non-source operators can also create
operator threads, but this is rare. In general, the number and location of operator threads are
not flexible because they are dictated by the application and the operator implementations.
The second source of threading is threaded ports. Threaded ports can be inserted at
any operator input port. When a tuple reaches a threaded port, the currently executing
thread will insert the tuple into the threaded port buffer, and go back to executing upstream
logic. A separate thread, dedicated to the threaded port, will pick up the queued tuples
and execute the downstream operators. Threaded port buffers are implemented as cache-
optimized concurrent lock-free queues [74].
The goal of our auto-pipelining solution is to automatically place threaded ports at
operator input ports during run-time, so as to maximize throughput.
4.3 System Overview
In this section we give an overview of our auto-pipelining solution. Figure 19 depicts the
functional components and the overall control flow of the solution. It consists of five main
stages that run in a continuous loop until a termination condition is reached.
The first stage is the profiling stage. In this stage a light-weight profiler determines how
much time each of the existing threads spend on executing the operators in the graph. This
profiling information, termed per-port utilization, is used as input to the optimization stage.
An optimization algorithm that uses a greedy heuristic determines what the next action
should be. The next action could either be to halt, as it could find nothing but an empty
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Figure 19: Overview of the auto-pipelining system.
set of threaded ports at this time, or it could be to add additional threads at specific input
ports. If the optimizer decides to add new threads, then the thread insertion component
applies this decision. This is followed by the evaluation component, which evaluates the
performance of the system after the thread insertions. The performance results from the
evaluation are put into the controller component as a feedback, which takes one of two
possible actions. It could vet all the thread insertions and go to the next iteration of the
process. Alternatively, it could remove some or all of the inserted threads, reverting back
the decisions taken by the optimizer. This could be followed by moving to the next iteration
of the process or halting the process. In the former case, it applies a blacklisting algorithm
to avoid coming up with the same ineffective configuration in the next iteration.
The system can be taken out of the halting state in case a shift in the workload conditions
is detected. However, the focus of this work is on finding an effective operating point right
after the application launch.
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4.3.1 An Example Scenario
Throughout the chapter we use an example application to illustrate various components
of our solution. The compile-time and run-time data flow graphs for this application are
given in Figures 20 and 21, respectively. For simplicity of exposition, we assume that all
operators have a single input port and a single output port. However, our solution trivially
extends to the general case and has been implemented and evaluated for the multi-port
scenario (see Section 4.8).
Figure 20: Operator graph
The sample application consists of an 11-operator graph as shown in Figure 20. There
are four source operators (namely, o0, o2, o5 and o7) which generate tuples. At runtime,
there are four threads initially, t0, . . . , t3, that execute the program, assuming no threaded
ports have been inserted. Figure 21 shows the execution path of different threads in dif-
ferent colors and shapes. Note that some operators are present in the execution path of
multiple threads. For instance, threads t0 and t1 share operator o3 in their execution paths.
The runtime graph cannot be derived solely from the compile-time graph. The paths
threads take can depend on tuple runtime values, as well as operator runtime behavior, such
as selectivity or tuple submission decisions. Hence, the compile-time graph restricts each
thread in terms of what operators it can traverse, but does not exactly define its path. We
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Figure 21: Runtime operator graph
derive the runtime graph based on runtime profiling (see Section 4.6).
We now look at the metrics that will help us formulate the auto-pipelining problem.
4.3.1.1 Profiling Metrics
The main profiling metric collected by our auto-pipelining solution is called the per-port
utilization, which we denote with µ(o, t). The variable o represents any arbitrary operator,
and t represents any thread that can execute that operator. We define the utilization, µ(o, t),
to be the amount of CPU utilized by thread t when executing all downstream operators
starting from the input port of operator o. During program execution, the profiler maintains
µ(o, t) for every operator/thread pair for which the thread t executes the operator o. In
Figure 21, for example, the input port of operator o6 is associated with utilization 30%,
meaning that thread t2 spends 30% of the CPU time on executing o6 and its downstream
operators, which are operators o4 and o10. Thus µ(o6, t2) = 0.3.
For each thread, we also define per-thread utilization, denoted as µ(t), which is the
overall CPU utilization of thread t. For example, in Figure 21, thread t2 has a utilization of
90%, thus µ(t2) = 0.9.
The reason we pick per-port CPU utilization, µ(o, t), as our main profiling metric is that
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it simplifies predicting the relative work distribution between threads after inserting a new
thread on an input port. For instance, if a threaded port is being added in front of operator
o6 in Figure 21, the newly created thread will take 30% CPU utilization from the existing
thread t2.
Predicting the relative work distribution for a potential thread insertion is performed in
the following way. Assume that T (o) = {t |µ(o, t) > 0} denotes the list of threads that
contain a given operator o in their execution path. Adding a threaded port at operator o
will have two consequences. First, all of the threads in T (o) will execute only up to the
input port of operator o. Second, a new thread, t′, will execute the rest of the executions
paths for all threads in T (o). The prediction of the work distribution for the newly created
thread t′ is µ′(t′) =
∑
t∈T (o) µ(o, t). For an existing thread t ∈ T (o), the prediction is
µ′(t) = µ(t)−µ(o, t). For instance, in Figure 21, when a threaded port is added to operator
o3, we predict µ
′(t0) = 0.4, µ
′(t1) = 0.5, and µ
′(t′) = 1.
It is important to note that µ′ is a relative metric of how the work is partitioned between
the existing threads and the newly created thread. It is not an accurate prediction of what
the CPU utilizations will be after the thread insertion. The expectation is that, given enough
processing resources and enough work present in the application, the actual utilizations (µ)
will be higher than the relative predictions (µ′). For instance, consider a simple chain of
operators executed by a single thread that has µ(t0) = 1. Adding a threaded port in the
middle of this chain will result in µ′(t0) = 0.5 and µ
′(t1) = 0.5. We use these relative uti-
lization values to assess whether or not inserting a new thread in this location will improve
performance. After the insertion, the optimistic expectation is that µ(t0) = µ(t1) > 0.5,
because u′(t0) < 1 and u
′(t1) < 1, which leaves room for improvement in throughput. The




The predicted relative utilizations are used to define a utility function that measures a
threaded port insertion’s goodness. Given an insertion at operator o, causing the creation
of thread t′, we define its utility as
U(o, t′) = max(µ′(t) | t ∈ T (o) ∪ {t′}).
The utility function for a given operator and its new thread is the largest predicted relative
work distribution across all of the threads with that operator in its path. Our goal is to
minimize this utility function. The intuition behind the utility function is simple: the thread
that has the highest predicted work (µ′) will become the bottleneck of the system.
Suppose T (o) = {t0} and our predictions after insertion of a new thread t′ at operator o
are µ′(t0) = 0.3 and µ
′(t′) = 0.6. The utility of this insertion is U(o, t′) = max(0.6, 0.3) =
0.6. A better insertion at a different operator o′, where T (o′) = {t0}, that would give a
lower utility value is: µ′(t0) = 0.5 and µ
′(t′) = 0.5, leading to U(o′, t′) = 0.5. However,
it may not always be possible to find such an insertion based on the per-port utilizations of
the operators reported by profiling.
For a set of thread insertions, say C = {〈o, t′〉}, we define an aggregate utility function
U(C) as:
U(C) = max(U(o, t′) | 〈o, t′〉 ∈ C).
Here, we pick the maximum of the individual utilities. We will further discuss and illustrate
the aggregate utility function shortly.
4.3.2 The Optimization Problem
Recall that the goal of the optimization stage is to find one or more threaded ports that
will improve the throughput of the system. We propose the following heuristic for the
optimization stage:
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Minimize the aggregate utility function while making sure that one and only one
threaded port is inserted in the execution path of each heavily utilized thread.
This formulation is based on three core principles:
1) Help the needy: At each step, we only insert threads in the execution path of heavily
utilized threads. A heavily utilized thread is a bottleneck, which implies that if it has more
resources, overall throughput will improve.
2) Be greedy but generous: By definition our solution is greedy, as at each step it comes
up with incremental insertions that will improve performance. However, inserting a single
thread at a time does not work, which is why we make sure that a thread is inserted in
the execution path of each heavily utilized thread. To see this point, consider the scenario
where two threads execute a simple chain of four equal sized operators. The first thread
executes the first two operators, and the second thread executes the remaining two. As an
incremental step, if we only help the first thread, we will end up having three threads, where
the last thread still executes two operators. This imbalance will become the bottleneck and
thus the throughput will not increase. But, if we help both of the two original threads, we
expect the throughput to increase.
A more subtle, but critical, point is the requirement that one and only one thread is
added to the execution path of each heavily utilized thread. This is strongly related to the
greedy nature of the algorithm. If we are to insert more than one thread in the execution path
of a given thread, then the prediction of a thread’s µ′ requires significantly more profiling
information (such as the amount of CPU time a thread spends downstream of a port when
it reaches that port by passing through a given set of upstream input ports). We want to
maintain a light-weight profiling stage that will not disturb application performance during
profiling. Hence, we make our algorithm greedy by inserting at most one thread in the
execution path of an existing thread, but for each one of the heavily utilized threads (thus
generous).
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3) Be fair: We minimize the utility function U , which means that new threads are
inserted such that the newly created and the existing threads have balanced load.
4.4 Optimization Algorithm
We now describe a base optimization algorithm and a set of enhancements that improve its
running time.
4.4.1 The Algorithm
For a simple chain of operators, designing an algorithm that meets the criteria given in
Section 4.3.2 is straightforward. However, operators that are shared across threads com-
plicate the design in the general case. We need to make sure that one and only one thread
is inserted in the execution path of each existing thread, even though the same thread can
be inserted in the execution path of multiple existing threads. The main idea behind the
algorithm is to reduce the search space via selection and removal of shared operators from
the set of possible solutions, and then explore each sub-space separately.
Before describing the algorithm in detail, we first introduce a simple matrix form that
represents a sub-space of possible solutions.
Matrix representation For each thread, we initially have all the operators in the execu-
tion path of it as a possible choice for inserting a threaded port. As the algorithm progresses,
we gradually remove some of the operators from the list to reduce the search space. For


















t0 o0, 90% o1, 15% o3, 50% o4, 20%
t1 o2, 100% o3, 50% o4, 20%
t2 o5, 90% o6, 30% o4, 15% o10, 5%
t3 o7, 95% o8, 60% o9, 30% o10, 20%
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The matrix contains one row for each thread in the unmodified application. For each row,
it lists the set of operators that are in the execution path of the thread with their associated
CPU utilization metrics, which is µ(o, t). Note that the source operators are placed on
the first column and are separated from the rest. They are not considered as potential
places to add threaded ports as they have no input ports. We exclude them from the matrix
representation for the rest of the chapter. The remaining operators are in no particular order,
but we sort them by their index for ease of exposition.
The algorithm is composed of four major phases, namely bottleneck selection, solution
reduction, candidate formation, and solution selection.
Bottleneck Selection The first phase is the bottleneck selection, which identifies highly
utilized threads. A threshold β ∈ [0, 1] is used to eliminate threads whose CPU utilizations
are below it. For instance, if β = 0.92, threads t0 and t2 are eliminated since their utiliza-
tions are smaller than the threshold and thus are not deemed bottlenecks. For the rest of this
section, we assume β = 0.8 for the running example, which means all of the four threads
are considered as bottlenecks.
Solution Reduction The second phase is the solution reduction, which performs a tree
search to reduce the solution space. At the root of the tree is the initial matrix. At each step,
we choose one of the leaf matrices that still contains shared operators based on the runtime
data flow graph. We pick one of these shared operators for that leaf matrix and perform
selection and removal to yield two sub-matrices in the tree.
Selection means that we select the shared operator as part of the solution, and thus
remove all other operators from the rows that contain the shared operator. Furthermore, we
remove all operators that originally appeared together with the shared operator in the same
row, from other rows, since they cannot be selected in a valid solution. Figure 22 shows
an example. Consider the edge labeled S3, which represents the case of selecting shared
operator 3. After the selection, the first two rows now have operator 3 as the only choice.
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Figure 22: Solution reduction and candidate formation.
Furthermore, operators 1 and 4—which previously appeared in the same row as 3—are
removed from all rows, as picking them would result in inserting more than one thread on
the execution paths of the first two threads.
Removal means we exclude the shared operator from the solution, and thus we remove
it from all rows where it appears. Figure 22 shows an example. Consider the edge labeled
R3, which represents the case of removing the shared operator 3.
The solution reduction phase continues until the leaf matrices have all of their shared
operators removed.
Candidate Formation After the solution reduction phase, all leaves of the tree contain
pre-candidate solutions. The goal of the candidate formation phase is to create candidate
solutions out of the pre-candidate ones. As part of candidate formation, first we apply a
filtering step. If we encounter a leaf matrix where a thread is left without an operator in its
row, yet there is another dependent thread that has a non-empty row, then we eliminate this
leaf matrix. We consider threads that share operators in their execution paths as dependent.
As an example, the rightmost two leaves in Figure 22 are removed in the filtering step.
After the filtering step, we convert each remaining pre-candidate solution into a candidate
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solution by making sure that each non-empty row contains a single operator, i.e., we convert
each matrix into a column vector. When there are multiple operators in a row, we compute
the utility function U(o, t) for each, and pick the one that gives the lowest value. As an
example, the pre-candidate solution pointed at by arrow S4 in Figure 22 is converted into a
candidate solution by picking operator 8 as opposed to operator 9. Operator 8 has a lower
utility value, U(o8, t3) = 0.6, compared to operator 9’s utility, U(o9, t3) = 0.65.
Solution Selection In the solution selection phase, we pick the best candidate among the
ones produced by the candidate formation phase. Recall that our utility function U(o, t)
was defined on a per-thread basis. To pick the best candidate, we use the aggregate utility
function U(C), where C = {〈o, t〉} represents a candidate solution. Recall that we pick
the maximum of the individual utilities2, thus U(C) = max(U(o, t) | 〈o, t〉 ∈ C). We
pick the candidate solution with the minimum aggregate utility as the final solution. In the
running example, this corresponds to picking C = {〈o4, t0〉, 〈o4, t1〉, 〈o4, t2〉, 〈o8, t3〉} with
aggregate utility of 0.8.
4.4.2 Complexity Analysis
Here, we provide a cost analysis of the base algorithm.
Suppose there are initially r threads, which is equal to the number of rows in the initial
solution matrix. Further assume that there are s shared operators in the runtime graph. To
analyze the complexity of our algorithm, we start by calculating the number of leaf can-
didates, denoted as cn(s, r), in the solution reduction phase. cn(s, r) =
∑
x cn(s, r, x),
where cn(s, r, x) denotes the number of candidates with x shared operators in them.






Note that a single candidate can have up to r
2
shared operators in it as each shared operator
fixes the assignments for at least two rows of the solution matrix. Therefore,
2When there are more than one dependent thread groups, utility U is computed independently for each





































The last step is due to a closed form for partial sum of binomial coefficients [83].
cn(s, r) can be used as a rough bound for algorithm complexity, assuming each candidate
costs O(1) computation units. The complexity of the algorithm can be further bounded by
considering that the solution reduction operates independently for sets of initial threads that





i ri = r and si represents the number of shared operators in the
ith thread group. For large graphs, max({ri}) is often smaller that r. However, this does
not change the worst case complexity.
We can provide a finer-grained complexity analysis by breaking down the per-candidate
cost. First, we use m to denote the number of operators that appear in the initial solution
matrix. The algorithm finds the set of shared operators in a two-level nested loop, in which
case each loop is a scan of the whole matrix, costing O(m2) units. During the solution re-
duction phase, cn(s, r) leaf candidates in the search tree implies cn(s, r)−1 = O(cn(s, r))
internal nodes. The split operation at each internal node needs a full scan of the matrix,
resulting in a cost of at most m. The candidate formation phase needs to scan the matrix
of each candidate, thus leading to per-candidate cost of at most m. The last phase, solu-
tion selection, costs r units per candidate since each candidate is a column vector. In total,
the complexity is bounded by O(m2 + cn(s, r) · (2m+ r)), which further simplifies to
O(m2 + cn(s, r) ·m).
As we will see later in Section 4.8, the algorithm runs quite fast in practice for large
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graphs, especially when the the pruning optimization is applied.
4.4.3 Algorithm Enhancements
We further propose and employ two enhancements to our basic algorithm.
Pruning: Our enhanced algorithm stops branching when it finds that the utility function
value for some of the rows in the current matrix is already equal to or larger than 100%. For
example, in Fig. 22, there is no point to continue branching after R4, since thread t1 has no
potential threaded port to add and will remain bottlenecked after inserting other threads.
Sorting: In the solution reduction phase, we use the degree of operator sharing as our
guideline for picking the next solution to further reduce. We sort the shared operators
based on the number of rows they appear in. This way, if a shared operator shows up in the
execution path of many threads, it is considered earlier in the exploration as it will result
in more effective reduction in the search space, especially when used with pruning. When
selected, shared operators have a higher chance of causing the utility function value to go
over 100% due to contribution from multiple threads.
4.5 Evaluation and Control
The thread insertions proposed by the optimization stage are put into effect by the runtime.
After inserting the new threads, the evaluation stage measures the throughput on input
ports which received a threaded port. The throughput is defined as the number of tuples
processed per second. If the throughput increased for all of the input ports that has received
a threaded port, then the controller stage moves on to the next iteration.
If the throughput has not increased for some of the input ports, then the control stage
performs blacklisting. The ports for which the throughput has not improved are blacklisted.
Furthermore, the thread insertions are reverted by removing these threaded ports from the
flow graph. Blacklisted input ports are excluded from consideration in future optimization
stages. If the percentage of blacklisted input ports exceeds a pre-defined threshold α ∈
[0, 1], then the process halts. Otherwise, we move on to the next iteration. It is possible that
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the process halts even before the threshold α is reached, as a feasable solution may not be
found during the optmization stage.
Alternative blacklisting policies can be applied to reduce the change of getting stuck at
a local minima. For instance, the blacklisted ports can be maintained on a per-pipelining
configuration basis rather than globally, at the cost of keeping more state around.
4.6 Profiler
We describe the basic design of the profiler component.
Our profiler follows the design principle of gprof [76], that is, to use both instrumen-
tation and periodic sampling for profiling. However, the instrumentation is not part of the
generated code. Instead, the SPL runtime has lightweight instrumentation which records
thread activity with respect to operator execution. More specifically, the instrumented SPL
runtime monitors the point at which a thread enters or exits an input port, so that it can
track which ports are currently active. It uses a special per-thread stack, called the E-stack,
for this purpose.
In order to collect the amount of CPU time a thread spends downstream of an input
port, our system periodically samples the thread status and traverses the E-stacks. We call
the period between two consecutive samplings the sampling period, denoted by ps. If there
are N occurrences during the last po seconds where thread t was found to be active doing
work downstream of operator o’s input port, then the per-port thread utilization µ(o, t) is
given by N
po/ps
. The intuition for this calculation is that it is the number of observations (N)
divided by how many times we sample during a given time period (po/ps).
Periodic sampling is inherently subject to statistical inaccuracy, thus enough samples
should be collected for accurate results. This could be achieved by either increasing the
duration of profiling (po) or decreasing the sampling period (ps). Given the long running
nature of streaming applications, we favor the former approach.
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Figure 23: Profiler implementation
4.6.1 Implementation notes
Our runtime profiler implementation consists of three components. Figure 23 illustrates
each component, which we also describe below.
E-stack For each application thread, the profiling system maintains a simple execution
stack, called an E-stack. The system pushes/pops entries into/from the E-stack every time
the thread associated with the stack enters/exits an operator. Figure 24 shows a snapshot of
the E-stack of a thread executing operator o10 after going through operators o5 and o6.
Signal handler For each sampling period ps, the profiling system checks the execution
stacks of all actively running threads. This is achieved by registering a timer for the sig-
nal SIGPROF with the timer interval set to ps. The operating system then sends signal
SIGPROF every ps seconds, which one of the application threads receives inside of a sig-
nal handler. Upon each receipt of the signal, the signal handler takes snapshots of the
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Figure 24: Example of an E-stack
E-stack for all currently active3 threads. For each stack entry in an E-stack snapshot, it
increments a counter for the thread and operator pair associated with the entry. Note that
it scans the entire stack because our goal is to compute the amount of CPU time a thread
spends downstream of a given operator input port. For instance, in Figure 24, it increments
the counters for operators o5, o6, and o10, as the active thread is doing work downstream of
all of these three operators at this time.
Summarization Every optimization period po, the counters maintained for each thread
and operator pair are summarized into the per-port thread utilization numbers. These are
the final set of statistics that will be used by the optimization stage.
A problem associated with the simple counting scheme used for profiling is that, in a
multi-threaded environment, the more active threads there are, the more frequently (in wall
clock time) signal SIGPROF is delivered. This skews the statistics. We use a mechanism
called frequency autoscaling to correct this skew. Rather than incrementing each counter
by 1 at each sampling step, we increment it by 1/A where A is the number of currently
active threads.
To handle profiling in a multi-threading environment, the consistency problem arises
when E-stacks are written by SPL runtime while being read by the signal handler.
HProf [93] tackles this problem by suspending threads at every sampling, which however
interrupts program execution and increases overhead. We avoid thread suspension or any
3The proc system in Linux is used for this purpose in the current prototype.
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locking mechanism by writing E-stack entries in an atomic yet efficient way.
Each stack entry is stored as a 64-bit volatile value in a 64-bit system — a 32-bit op-
erator identifier and a 32-bit port index. We rely on the details of the Intel architecture to
ensure that reading the stack entries is atomic. The current size of the stack is also kept as
a volatile counter. Since the updating of the stack entries and the stack size are not trans-
actional, sometimes the profiler can scan an entry that is not active. However, since this
happens with very low frequency it barely impacts the aggregate values computed by the
profiler.
4.7 Dynamic Thread Insertion/Removal
Thread insertion and removal is implemented by dynamically adding and removing
threaded ports. Both activities require suspending the current flow of data for a very
brief amount of time, during which the circular buffer associated with the threaded port is
added/removed to/from the data flow graph. Finally, the suspended flow is resumed. Sus-
pending the flow, however, is not the only step necessary to preserve safety. In the presence
of stateful operators, dynamic lock insertion and removal is required to ensure mutually
exclusive access to shared state, as elaborated below. Our implementation does make use
of thread pools, since the additional work that is performed during thread injection and
removal dominates the overall cost.
4.7.1 Locking & Thread Insertion/Removal
There is a subtle concern regarding thread safety in the presence of thread insertion/removal
and multi-threaded execution of stateful operators. Before we describe the potential prob-
lems that may result from thread insertions, we first give a brief overview of the relevant
aspects of the programming model used to develop operators in SPL.
Operators are implemented through an event-driven interface as described in Sec-
tion 4.2.1. An operator that contains state which is modified as a result of processing tuples
delivered to one of its input ports is said to be stateful. Such operators need to ensure that
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the state is protected against concurrent modification. Recall that operators can be executed
concurrently by multiple threads. In SPL, stateful operators use an auto port mutex object
to protect their state from concurrent modification. An auto port mutex is a scoped mutex
that either creates a critical section around a block of code, or simply reduces to a no-op at
the cost of an untaken branch.
The SPL runtime decides which one of these behaviors is to be exhibited depending
on safety analysis. Operator developers always protect their state from concurrent access
using auto port mutexes, yet the runtime can decide to effectively remove these mutexes
when it is safe to do so. The safety analysis is performed by a simple process of thread
propagation to decide if an operator can potentially be called by multiple threads.
Figure 25: Thread propagation: Initial state
Figure 26: Thread propagation: After adding port 2
The thread propagation analysis is performed every time a thread is inserted or removed
at runtime. When a thread is inserted, the analysis is needed to turn on some of the auto
port mutexes to ensure safety. For a thread removal, it needs to be performed to turn off
some of the auto port mutexes to ensure good performance.
Figure 25 shows an example SPL application. In this example, we want to add a
threaded port to operator o2. As a result of this change, there will be two threads exe-
cuting the downstream operator o3 as shown in Figure 26. If o3 is a stateful operator, then
the auto port mutexes used by the operator are turned on by the runtime, before the flow is
resumed following the insertion.
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4.8 Experimental Results
We evaluate the effectiveness of our solution based on experimental results. We perform
three kinds of experiments. First, we use micro-benchmarks to evaluate the components
of our solution and verify the assumptions that underlie our techniques. Second, we eval-
uate the running time efficiency of our optimization algorithm under varying topologies
and application sizes, using synthetic applications. Third, using three real-world applica-
tions, we compare the throughput our auto-pipelining scheme achieves to that of manual
optimization as well as no optimization.
4.8.1 Experimental Setup
We have implemented our auto-pipelining scheme in C++, as part of the SPL runtime
within System S [82].
All of our experiments were performed on a host with 2 Intel Xeon processors. Each
processor has 4 cores, and each core is a 2-way SMT, exposing 16 hardware threads per
node, but only 8 independent cores. When running the experiments, we turn off hyper-
threading so that the number of virtual cores equals the number of physical cores (which is
8).
4.8.2 Micro-benchmarks
For the micro-benchmarks, we use a simple application topology that consists of a chain of
8 operators. All operators have the same cost and perform the same operation (a series of
multiplications). The cost of an operator is configurable.
4.8.2.1 Pipelining benefit
Pipelining is beneficial under two conditions. First, enough hardware resources should
exist to take advantage of an additional thread. Second, the overhead of copying a tuple
to a buffer and a thread switch-over should be small enough to benefit from the additional
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Figure 27: Speedup vs. processing cost.
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Figure 28: Profiling overhead vs. sampling rate.
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Figure 29: Speedup for different # of threads
parallelism. When these conditions do not hold, the evaluation and control stages of our
auto-pipelining solution will detect this and adjust the adaptation process.
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Figure 30: Adaptation with auto-pipelining
We evaluate the pipelining benefit and show how it relates to the overhead associated
with threaded ports by measuring the speedup obtained when executing our application
with two threads instead of one. Figure 27 plots the speedup as a function of the per-tuple
processing cost, for different tuple sizes. When the per-tuple processing cost is small, it
is expected that using an additional thread will introduce significant overhead. In fact, we
observe that the additional thread reduces the performance (speedup less than 1). As the
per-tuple processing cost gets higher, we see that perfect speedup of 2× is achieved. The
tuple sizes also have an impact on the benefit of pipelining. For large tuple sizes, the addi-
tional copying required to go through a buffer creates overhead. Thus, the crossover point
for achieving > 1× speedup happens at a lower per-tuple cost for smaller sized tuples.
For small tuples, custom allocators [123] can be used to further improve the performance.
For large tuples, the copying of the data contents dominates the cost. While copy-on-write
(COW) techniques can be used to avoid this cost, it is well accepted that COW optimiza-
tions are not effective in the presence of multi-threading.
4.8.2.2 Profiling overhead
Light-weight profiling that does not disturb application performance is essential for per-
forming auto-pipelining at run-time. In Figure 28 we study the profiling overhead. The
overhead is defined as the percent reduction in the throughput compared to the non-profiling
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case. The figure plots the overhead as a function of the number of samples taken per sec-
ond, for different number of threads. The operators are evenly distributed across threads.
We observe that, as a general trend, the profiling overhead increases as the profiling rate
grows. For the remainder of the experiments in this chapter, we use a profiling sampling
rate of ps = 100, which corresponds to a 3% reduction in performance. Note that the pro-
filer is only run for a specific period (for po seconds) during one iteration of the adaptation
phase. Once the adaptation is complete, no overhead is incurred due to profiling.
We further observe that increasing the profiling rate beyond a threshold does not in-
crease the overhead anymore. This is because the system starts to skip profiling signals
when the sampling period ps is shorter than the time needed to run the logic associated
with the profiling signal. Interestingly, the profiling overhead does not monotonically in-
crease with the number of threads. At first glimpse, this may be unexpected since more
threads means more execution stacks to go through during profiling. However, with more
threads, each execution stack has less entries, which decreases the overhead.
For most operator graphs, it is the depth of the operator graph that impacts the worst
case profiling cost, rather than the number of threads used. For instance, for a linear chain,
the number of stack entries to be scanned only depends on the depth of the graph. For bushy
graphs this number can also depend on the number of threads, even though it is rarely linear
in the number of threads in practice (a reverse tree is the worst case).
4.8.2.3 Impact of threads
Recall that one of the principles of our optimization is to insert a threaded port in the
execution path of each bottleneck thread. We do this because the speedup from adding
threads one-at-a-time will result in a series of non-improvements, followed by a jump in
performance when all bottleneck threads finally get help. In Figure 29, we verify this effect.
The figure plots the speedup as a function of the number of threads, for different tuple costs.
The threads are inserted in a balanced way, by picking the thread that executes the highest
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number of operators and partitioning it into two threads.
We observe that, for sufficiently high per-tuple processing costs, the speedup is a piece-
wise function which jumps at certain number of threads, like 2, 4, and 8. Each such jump
point corresponds to a partitioning where all threads execute the same number of operators.
This result justifies our algorithm design which inserts multiple threaded ports in one round.
For low per-tuple processing costs (such as 28) the speedup is not ideal, and for very low
per-tuple processing costs (such as 24), the performance degrades.
4.8.2.4 Adaptation
We evaluate the adaptation capability of our solution by turning on auto-pipelining in an
application whose topology is a simple chain of Functor operators. For this experiment,
we measure the throughput of the application as a function of time. The adaptation period
is set to 5 seconds. We report the throughput relative to the sequential case. Figure 30
reports these results for different per-tuple processing costs.
We observe that our algorithm intelligently achieves optimal speedup for different per-
tuple costs. For instance, when the per-tuple cost is 24, our algorithm finds out that its
second optimization decision does not improve overall throughput, and thus it rolls back
to the previous state. For higher per-tuple costs, such as 220, the algorithm does not stop
adding threaded ports until it reaches the unpartitionable state, that is 1 operator per thread.
Comparing Figures 29 and 30, we see that auto-pipelining lands on the globally optimal
configuration in terms of the throughput.
The total adaptation time of the system depends on two major components: (i) the num-
ber of steps taken, and (ii) the adaptation period. Since our algorithm helps all bottlenecked
threads at each step, its behavior with respect to the number steps taken is favorable. For
instance it takes log2(8) = 3 steps to reach 8 threads in Figure 30. For more dynamic sce-
narios, we can reduce the adaptation period to reduce the overall adaptation time. The only
downside is that, reducing the adaptation period without decreasing the accuracy of the
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profiling data requires increasing the profile sampling rate, which can increase the profiling
cost.
4.8.2.5 Operator cost vs. throughput
Figure 31: Per-tuple processing time and max. rate as a function of processing cost.
Figure 31 plots the time it takes to process a single tuple (left y-axis), as well as the
maximum rate of processing that can be achieved with a single operator (right y-axis) as a
function of the per-tuple processing cost represented as the number of multiplications.
4.8.3 Synthetic Benchmarks
This set of experiments evaluate the running-time efficiency of our optimization algorithm,
as well as the effectiveness of the two enhancements, pruning and sorting.
In these experiment, we use two different kinds of synthetic topologies. These are the
reverse tree and the random graph topologies. For a reverse tree topology, each leaf-level
operator serves as a starting point for a different thread and each thread executes the set of
operators that forms a path from the leaf-level operator to the root. We pick this topology as
it represents an extreme scenario where there is massive amount of sharing across threads.
In our experience, this kind of topology is not seen often in practice.
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For a random topology, operator IDs are randomly picked from a finite domain of inte-
gers [0, d). Here, a parameter called sampled ratio, denoted by sr, is used to measure the
degree of overlapping between threads, that is, how many operators in one thread can be
shared by another thread. Suppose there are n threads and each thread executes m opera-
tors, then sr = n·m
d
. Utilization values are uniformly distributed among operators for each
thread.
We run each experiment 5 times and report the average performance numbers. The
reported performance is the search cost, which is quantified by the number of tree nodes
traversed during the execution of the optimization algorithm.





















Figure 32: Performance of optimization algorithm with the reverse tree topology
Figure 32 presents the results for the reverse tree topology, in which different tree sizes
are tested from 23 to 26. As expected, search costs of our basic algorithm (i.e., without
any enhancements) grow exponentially with the number of shared operators 4. We observe
that compared to the basic algorithm, pruning is very effective. It achieves an order of
magnitude saving in search cost (the y-axis is in log scale). Applying sorting on top of
pruning provides modest additional improvement, only for small number of operators.
Our results are further corroborated by the random graph based experiments. For these
experiments, we varied two parameters: the number of operators n and the sampled ratio
4In a reverse tree topology, the number of operators equals that of shared operators.
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Figure 33: Performance of optimization algorithm with random topology
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Figure 34: Lois – Cosmic ray shower detection application
sr. These results are shown in Figure 33.
Figure 33a plots the search cost as a function of number of operators with fewer sharing
(the sampled ratio sr is as small as 0.5), while Figure 33b plots the search cost as a function
of number of operators with more sharing (sr is set to 2). We observe that although the
search costs with more sharing between threads tend to be higher, the overall trend with
increasing number of operators is similar. Search costs largely grow linear with the number
of operators.
Figure 33c plots the search cost as a function of the sampled ratio. We observe that
the search costs first grow with increasing sampled ratios and then drop. While increased
sharing raises the cost of the algorithm initially, excessive sharing results in shrinking the
search space, resulting in this bi-modal behavior.
Overall, Figure 33 shows that pruning is a very effective optimization strategy for our
algorithm, under various circumstances, often providing an order of magnitude improve-
ment in running time.
4.8.4 Application Benchmarks
The application benchmarks consist of three real-world stream processing applications with
their associated workloads. These applications are named Lois, Vwap, and LinearRoad.
The LinearRoad application (the smallest of the three) is depicted in Figure 36, whereas
other applications are depicted below.
The Lois [21] dataset is collected from a Scandinavian radio-telescope under construc-
tion in northwestern Europe. The goal of the Lois application is to detect cosmic ray
showers by processing the live data received from the radio-telescope.
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Figure 35: Vwap – Bargain detection application
The Vwap [38] dataset contains financial market data in the form of a stream of real-
time bids and quotes. The goal of the Vwap application is to detect bargains and trading
opportunities based on the processing of the live financial feed.
LinearRoad [39] dataset contains speed, direction, and position data for vehicles travel-
ing on road segments. The goal of the application is to compute tolls for vehicles traveling
on the hypothetical “Linear Road” highway.
4.8.4.1 Application Graphs
The Vwap and Lois applications are depicted in Figures 35 and 34, respectively. Linear-
Road application is depicted in Figure 36.
Vwap is a medium-scale application (58 operators) that contains large number of Func-
tor, Join, and Aggregate operators. The heavy joins and aggregations create opportunities
for pipeline parallelism.
Lois is a small-scale application (22 operators) that contains large number of Functor
operators. It contains 3 Barriers, which is indicative of task parallelism being present in
the flow graph. LinearRoad is a small-scale application (15 operators) that contains large
number of Custom operators. It contains 2 Unions, which is indicative of task parallelism
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also being present in the flow graph.
The Lois and LinearRoad applications have few branches in their topology, whereas
Vwap has many. The LinearRoad application makes heavy use of custom operators,
whereas the other applications are composted of mostly built-in operators.
Table 7 gives a breakdown of the operators constituting the three applications.
Table 7: Breakdown of operators used in the Lois and Vwap applications
Instance Count
Operator Kind Lois Vwap LinearRoad
Functor 13 24 3
Join 0 12 0
Split 0 3 2
Barrier 3 0 0
Union 0 0 2
Aggregator 2 12 0
Custom 1 0 5
FileSource 1 1 1
FileSink 2 6 1
It is important to note that the Lois and LinearRoad applications have few bush seg-
ments in their topology, whereas Vwap has many. The LinearRoad application makes
heavy use of custom operators, whereas the other applications are composted of mostly
built-in operators.
Figure 36: LinearRoad – A vehicle toll computation app.
We run three versions of these programs: unoptimized, hand-optimized, and auto-
pipelined. The hand-optimized versions are created by explicitly inserting threaded ports
in the SPL code of the application. This was carried out by the application developers,
independent of our work. For all cases, we measure the total execution time for the entire
data set. For the auto-pipelined version, the adaptation period is also included as part of the
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total execution time.
Figure 37 gives the results. For the Lois application, we see around 1.5× speedup com-
pared to the unoptimized version, for Vwap we see around 3× speedup, and for LinearRoad
we see 2.56× speedup. Note that these are real-world applications, where sequential por-
tions and I/O bound pieces (sources and sinks) make it difficult to attain perfect speedup.
It is impressive that our auto-pipelining solution matches the hand-optimized performance
in the case of Lois, and improves upon it by around 2× for both Vwap and LinearRoad. It
is also worth noting that in the case of Lois, the programmer has statically added threaded
ports based on her experience and the suggestion from a fusion optimization tool called
COLA [85]. Considering that the auto-pipeliner takes around 20 seconds to adapt in this
particular case, the throughout attained for the auto-pipelining solution is in fact higher
than the hand-optimized case.
Figure 37: Running time for Lois and Vwap
Overall, auto-pipelining provides equal or significantly better performance compared
to hand optimization, at no additional cost to the application developers.
4.9 Related Work
Our work belongs to the area of auto-parallelization and we survey the related topics ac-
cordingly.
Dynamic multi-threaded concurrency platforms, such as Cilk++ [2], OpenMP [26], and
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x10 [54], decouple expressing a program’s innate parallelism from its execution configu-
ration. OpenMP and Cilk++ are widely used language extensions for shared memory pro-
grams, which help express parallel execution in a program at development-time and take
advantage of it at run-time.
Kremlin [68] is an auto-parallelization framework that complements OpenMP [26].
Kremlin recommends to programmers a list of regions for parallelization, which is ordered
by achievable program speedup.
Cilkview [78] is a Cilk++ analyzer of program scalability in terms of number of cores.
Cilkview performs system-level modeling of scheduling overheads and predicts program
speedup. Bounds on the speedup are presented to programmers for further analysis.
Autopin [87] is an auto-configuration framework for finding the best mapping between
system cores and threads. Using profile runs, Autopin exhaustively probes all possible
mappings and finds the best pinning configuration in terms of performance.
StreamIt [75] is a language for creating streaming applications and can take advantage
of parallelism present in data flow graph representation of applications, including task,
pipeline, and data parallelism. However, StreamIt is mostly a synchronous streaming sys-
tem, where static scheduling is performed based on compile-time analysis of filters written
in the StreamIt language.
Alchemist [132] is a dependence profiling technique based on post-dominance analysis
and is used to detect candidate regions for parallel execution. It is based on the obser-
vation that a procedure with few dependencies with its continuation benefits more from
parallelization.
Task assignment in distributed computing has been an active research problem for
decades. General task assignment is intractable. In [50], several programs with special
structures are considered and the optimal assignment is found by using a graph theoretic
approach.
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There has been extensive research in the literature on compiler support for instruction-
level or fine-grained pipelined parallelism [88]. In this work, we look at coarse-grained
pipelining techniques that address the problem of decomposing an application into higher-
level pieces that can execute in pipeline parallel.
Relevant to our study is the work in [63], which provides compiler support for coarse-
grained pipelined parallelism. To automate pipelining, it selects a set of candidate filter
boundaries (a middleware interface exposed by DataCutter [48]), determines the commu-
nication volume for these boundaries, and performs decomposition and code generation in
order to minimize the execution time. To select the best filters, communication costs across
each filter boundary are estimated by static program analysis and a dynamic programming
algorithm is used to find the optimal decomposition.
A more detailed analysis of the differences of our work from others is given in Ap-
pendix 4.10.
4.9.1 Related Work on Profilers
There are generally two ways to implement a program profiler; statistical sampling
and code instrumentation. While sampling is less disruptive to the base program,
instrumentation-based profiling can obtain more accurate results.
OProfile [27] and DCPI [37] are representative of sampling-based profiling schemes.
They use hardware performance counters to attain high frequency with fairly low overhead.
Code instrumentation for profiling can be applied statically (i.e., before program exe-
cution) or dynamically (i.e., during execution). In particular, static instrumentation code
can be added to source code manually, automatically through compiler assist, or to the
compiled binary via binary translation.
Gprof [76] is a hybrid profiler in the sense that both instrumentation and sampling are
used. Static instrumentation keeps track of caller graph and the execution time is obtained
by statistical sampling. Our profiler used in auto-pipelining is similar in the sense that
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it uses both sampling and instrumentation, but the instrumentation is dynamically turned
on/off within the SPL runtime, rather then being injected at compile-time.
4.10 Comparison to Related Systems
Compared to [63] our auto-pipelining scheme is executed during runtime, since stream
processing applications can contain arbitrary user-defined operators and dynamic runtime
behavior, making static analysis impractical. This leads to various different design choices:
First, rather than relying on static program analysis, we use online profiling to estimate
the system overheads and to discover system bottlenecks. Second, while offline decom-
position can afford to use dynamic programming for global optimal filter/threaded port
selection, our online approach relies on a greedy algorithm for exploring local optimality.
Last, computing units in our pipelines do not need to be linearly chained.
Compared to StreamIt, SPL applications follow the asynchronous streaming model,
where operator selectivity, cost, and behavior are not known at compile-time. The approach
we presented in this chapter is thus completely dynamic, both in terms of profiling and
optimization.
Compared to other existing work, our auto-pipelining solution is similar to Autopin
in terms of run-time auto-configuration. However, our solution avoids exhaustive search
by employing a novel optimization algorithm which is based on profiling statistics. In
terms of automatically finding parallelism opportunities, our system is similar to Kremlin
and Cilkview. However, the threaded ports exposed in the SPL runtime provide a flexi-
ble mechanism for optimization, only requiring operator-level profiling information. Thus
we avoid the heavy profiling needs of systems like Kremlin and Cilkview. Finally, auto-




In this chapter, we have described an auto-pipelining solution for data stream processing ap-
plications. It automatically discovers pipeline and task parallelism opportunities in stream
processing applications, and applies dynamic profiling and controlling to adjust the level of
parallelism needed to achieve the best throughput. Our solution is transparent in the sense
that no changes are required on the application source code. Our experimental evaluation
shows that our solution is also effective, matching or exceeding the speedup that can be
achieved via expert tuning. Our solution has been implemented on a commercial-grade





In this dissertation, I explore the big-data system design for the cloud from the perspective
of data security and high performance. I make the following technical contributions.
First, I proposed HINDEX, for secondary index support on top of write-optimized
key-value stores. To update the index structure efficiently in the face of an intensive
write stream, HINDEX synchronously executes append-only operations and defers the so-
called index-repair operations which are expensive. The core contribution of HINDEX is
a scheduling framework for deferred and lightweight execution of index repairs. HINDEX
has been implemented and is currently being transferred to an IBM big data product.
Second, I proposed Auto-pipelining for automatic performance optimization of stream-
ing applications on multi-core machines. The goal is to prevent the bottleneck scenario in
which the streaming system is blocked by a single core while all other cores are idling,
which wastes resources. To partition the streaming workload evenly to all the cores and
to search for the best partitioning among many possibilities, I proposed a heuristic based
search strategy that achieves locally optimal partitioning with lightweight search overhead.
The key idea is to use a white-box approach to search for the theoretically best partitioning
and then use a black-box approach to verify the effectiveness of such partitioning. The
proposed technique, called Auto-pipelining, is implemented on IBM Stream S.
Third, I proposed ǫ-PPI, a suite of privacy preserving index algorithms that allow data
sharing among unknown parties and yet maintaining a desired level of data privacy. To
differentiate privacy concerns of different persons, I proposed a personalized privacy def-
inition and substantiated this new privacy requirement by the injection of false positives
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in the published ǫ-PPI data. To construct the ǫ-PPI securely and efficiently, I proposed to
optimize the performance of multi-party computations which are otherwise expensive; the
key idea is to use addition-homomorphic secret sharing mechanism which is inexpensive
and to carry out the distributed computation in a scalable P2P overlay.
5.2 Future Work
5.2.1 Elastic Storage Services in the Cloud
One unique characteristic of the cloud is the pay-as-you-go business model which leads
to highly dynamic workloads. To adapt to the dynamic workload needs in the cloud and
to minimize overhead, elastic resource provisioning is required. While existing key-value
stores are scalable in the sense of being easy to add/remove storage nodes, they are not
innately elastic; Most of key-value stores do not support the self-adjust ability to adapt
their system and resource provisioning to the changing workload. Thus, one of the future
research is to extend key-value stores to elastically support the changing workloads.
Supporting elastic key-value stores is a challenging problem, since it requires monitor-
ing dynamic cloud workloads and making correct prediction of the future workload. The
monitoring component needs to be lightweight and not to interfere the original workload.
Predicting the future trend may require complex learning mechanisms to deeply under-
stand the current workload. In addition, given a correctly predicted workload, it is difficult
to search for the best software configuration that optimizes the performance. Because the
key-value stores are complex distributed software with a large number of tuning knobs, it
presents a large search space for the optimal software configuration.
5.2.2 NewSQL for Real-Time Analytics
Supporting big data management and scalable SQL has recently attracted a great deal of
attentions in industry and is pioneered by many projects in big companies including Google
F1, IBM BigInsights and so on. While shared-nothing databases has been studied in the
research community for long time, it is the sheer volume of big data, large scale of cloud
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systems and unique requirement of modern Web 2.0 applications that make the problem
of supporting SQL on big data (or NewSQL) distinctive. Given the recent popularity of
NoSQL stores and sustained success of relational databases, it presents new system design
opportunities and challenges to get the best from the both worlds; while the SQL based re-
lational databases offers strong consistency and optimized query performance, the NoSQL
stores excel in schema-free flexibility and scalability. It would be interesting to explore the
NewSQL research by supporting SQL on top of NoSQL stores.
One open problem of the future NewSQL research is to extend existing NoSQL stores
and to design and develop a middleware layer between the storage tier and application
tier to support analytical and transactional workloads with interactive performance. In this
regards, my HINDEX work is the first step towards NewSQL that supports specific kinds of
SQL queries, that is, SQL with value-based query parameter in WHERE statement. Other
interesting problems can be further explored such as intelligent mapping of applications
to correct data infrastructures by analyzing the service level agreement and application
program characteristics. A possible approach is to apply the scalable data management
technique in P2P networks (e.g. P2P data indexing [121, 119, 122, 120]) to the context of
key-value stores and clouds.
5.2.3 Secure Key-Value Stores
While key-value stores are usually deployed in the public cloud where trusts are limited,
existing key-value store systems lack security support. When cloud customers are upload-
ing their sensitive data to the cloud, they expect their data can be protected in terms of both
data confidentiality and authenticity.
To provide data confidentiality, access control mechanism and data encryption are two
common technology. It would be an interesting research area to support fine-grained access
control on key-value stores, and to enforce the access rules on the encrypted data.
Data authenticity is equally important for protecting key-value data in the cloud. When
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a cloud customer uploads her data to the cloud, she might want to guarantee that the data
stays unchanged when she will retrieve it back in the future. Data authenticity guarantees
such property. While research work has been initiated to study the authenticated key-value
store [117, 103, 110, 67], there are various open research problems and opportunities that
can be studied, including but not limited to high-performance data authentication in the
presence of expensive encryption operations, verification of data freshness in the eventual
consistent stores, and others.
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